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Official Journal of the Asian Bioethics Association (ABA)

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Editorial: New website eubios.info

- Darryl Macer, Ph.D.

UNESCO Bangkok, Thailand

The Eubios Ethics Institute has a new independent domain name and website, **eubios.info**. The entire site has been shifted to that website, so please update your references in browsers and websites. This will ensure independence as a forum for free deliberation of different points of view in bioethics and philosophical reflection. The views of papers are always those of the authors, and this is important in a field like bioethics which encourages interaction and dialogue over topics with many policy implications, and often divergent viewpoints.

In this issue we can find several examples of philosophical analysis applied to bioethics issues facing individuals and societies, which both face rapid and dramatic changes in the communities we are members of. Arthur Saniotis examines the application of the human behaviour to conflict resolution. The behaviour yahoo listserve still has some debate over the proposal I made in 2004, which was subject to several intensive conference sessions.

Serge Roganov explores parallels between debates of individual death with the demise of the Soviet Union. Paolo Cattorini examines the way that pain is experienced and the narratives held on it. There is criticism of reductionist trends against religion by Verma, followed by an extensive review and debate over the ethics of climate change policy and the Kyoto Protocol.

Asian Bioethics Association (ABA) members can find the composition of the new Board, in the ABA election results notice in this issue, and a farewell message from the Fourth ABA President, Song Sang-yong. The forthcoming ABC will be in Bangkok, 19-23 March, 2007, and promises over 100 original papers from around the region in 5 days of intense dialogue and debate. Two recent COMEST declarations are included to remind us of the need to apply our research in ethics to policy, and that policy commitments have been made which can be useful catalysts for practical bioethics.

Send papers to the editor in electronic form if possible.

Please use reference style used in News section, do not use automatic footnotes or endnotes. Papers are peer reviewed. The papers do not represent the views of Eubios Ethics Institute, which upholds the principles of freedom of expression.

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Deadline for the January 2007 issue is **18 January, 2007**.

ABA Presidential message

- Song Sang-yong,
3rd President, Asian Bioethics Association

Dear ABA members,

As the outgoing President of the Asian Bioethics Association (ABA), I confirm the report (p.195) of the Secretary on the results of the 2006 election. My whole-hearted congratulations to Jayapaul Azariah, the 4th ABA President; Pak Un Jong, re-elected Vice-President; Asai Atsushi, Abhik Gupta, Soraj Hongladarom, Aamir Jafarey, Alireza Bagheri and Wang Yanguang, newly-elected Vice-Presidents, and Darryl Macer, re-elected Secretary. It has been a great pleasure for me to work with wonderful Vice-Presidents in the past: Zhai Xiaomei, Tanida Noritoshi, Jayapaul Azariah, Leonardo de Castro, Sahin Aksoy and Frank Leavitt.

The Asian Bioethics Association started in Beijing in 1995 as East Asian Association of Bioethics, changing to the ABA in 1997 at the time of the UNESCO Asian Bioethics Conference in Kobe. In 1995 we elected Hyakudai Sakamoto as Founding President. He served for seven years and then the rule of rotation of Presidents was made with the adoption of the constitution at the Fourth Asian Bioethics Conference in Seoul. Qiu Renzong was elected the 2nd ABA President in Seoul in 2002. I took over the presidentship in 1998 two years later. We are sure to have no shortage of capable persons for future Presidents.

It's time to bid farewell as President. I would like to extend my gratitude to all ABA members for their co-operation. I very much hope that ABA will be activated by the new younger team. I wish all a Happy New Year for 2007 and I hope to see you all in Bangkok in March.

November 2006

Human Behaviourome as Cross Cultural Tool with Reference to Conflict Resolution

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Introduction

This paper will discuss the human behaviourome as a cross cultural tool in relation to conflict resolution. The use of the human behaviourome as a cross cultural tool has been given special attention by Macer (2004) as a way of understanding human diversity. Macer's aim is to be able to map cross cultural strategies of human co-

operation for the present and future. The development of a common language for life studies and ideas is a projected objective of the human behaviourome (Macer 2004:9).

The human behaviourome's scope and aims work within the ambit of the human social sciences. For example, in both anthropology and sociology human cultures are viewed as dynamic, non-static and syncretistic. In addition, human beings are resourceful, often re-working old ideas and paradigms within new social contexts. This concurs with the anthropologist Claude Levi Strauss's notion of the "*bricoleur*"— a 'bits and pieces' person who can re-adapt old ways of thinking to new social experiences. While Levi Strauss examines the transformation of indigenous myths during the time of colonialism, my interest here is to explore how human beings continually use conflict resolution models in order to mitigate various kinds of violence. This is one area in which the human behaviourome can be used.

Human Aggression: Cultural Constructions

Aggression has seemingly been intrinsic to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Although we have little knowledge on the reasons and machinations of human conflict in prehistory, it stands to good reason that our prehistoric predecessors had developed conflict resolution methods alongside other social systems. The apparent universal propensity of human aggression has led behaviourist theorists to suggest that there is an "innate drive" towards aggressive behaviour (Ehrlich 2000:210). However, as Eibl-Eibesfeldt points out: "There is no conclusive proof of the existence of a primary aggressive drive, but there is strong circumstantial evidence that suggests it" (1979:114).¹

The ability for early Homo sapiens to survive and become masters of their environment was contingent upon the level of co-operation between group members. Homo sapiens would have known early in their development that inter and intra-species conflict diminished the chances for group survival. The development of the neo-cortex with its prolific parallel processing led to the formation of complex social systems, technology, language, advanced planning and intense consciousness (Ehrlich 2000:209). The technological explosion in the last 10,000 years (Van Schaik 2006:37), has also given rise to new kinds of social aggression based on organized power and ritualized forms of violence.

Eminent thinkers such as Paul Ehrlich contend that early hunter-gatherer societies probably followed acephalous and non-stratified systems which fostered egalitarianism. Such societies would rarely have had food surpluses thereby making dominant behaviours less advantageous (Ehrlich 2000:209). In addition, these societies had probably developed various co-operative

¹ See also Ardrey (1961, 1966) and Lorenz (1966.).

strategies which dissuaded socially dominant behaviours. The egalitarian hypothesis is supported by present day hunter-gatherer societies such as the Inuit people. In Inuit society overly dominant, disruptive and violent behaviours are socially proscribed (Ehrlich 2000:209). As in other hunter-gatherer societies social opprobrium ranges from ridicule, public admonition and even assassination (Ehrlich 2000:209). Ehrlich relates a story of how one 'disruptive' man belonging to the *Aivilikmiut* Inuit was dealt with: "We would take him out seal hunting on a Peterhead (boat), and then when someone was shooting at a seal, the man's head would get in the way. *Ayorminut*" (Ehrlich 2000:209). (*Ayorminut* translated roughly "Such things happen" or "Too bad; it couldn't be helped") (Ehrlich 2000:209). In the case of the Inuit and other indigenous cultures aggression is sometimes used where a potential for serious social disruption is perceived (Ehrlich 2000:209). Social disruption can also be constructed in relation to witchcraft which instigates accusing and punishing a witch (Lienhardt 1951; Douglas 1970). The fact that witchcraft is construed as being socially disruptive reaffirms Mary Douglas's thesis on pollution and social categories. For Douglas a witch threatens the social boundaries that delineate socially sanctioned and proscribed behaviours. In short, a witch is a liminal figure — ambiguous, menacing and inimical, existing between and betwixt social categories, and thereby, threatening the moral structure of society (Douglas 1969).

According to Ehrlich the roots of human aggression could be a "culturally evolved trait" (2000:211). The notion of culturally evolved aggression is given credence in relation to the growth of stratified societies. Ehrlich et al note a link between increasing violence and technological sophistication and stratification of societies (2000:212). In western societies, the impulse towards aggression has in the last two centuries been expedited by several factors — formation of nation states and centralised modes of governance, growth of virulent strains of nationalism, and a new mode of production which fostered the commodification of labour and de-personalisation. Authors such as Athanasiou (2003) and Saniotis (2006a) claim that the holocaust of Jews, Gypsies and other minority groups during World War Two could only have come into existence precisely because of the aforementioned factors. As Saniotis states: "the apotheosis of technological governance was personified by the Nazi concentration camps. For the first time in human history human beings were subjected to such a totalising regime of bodily management where they have become an "assembly line of decorporealisation", body parts repeatedly beaten and mutilated — reduced to 'thingness'" (Athanasiou 2003:134).


Athanasiou (cited in Saniotis 2006a) observes that the Nazi concentration camps ushered a new kind of bio-

power, "in terms of mechanical economy" — via destructive technologies (2003:134).

Conflict Resolution and Peace Making

The growth of new kinds of human aggression in the 20th century have also led to the rise of peace making initiatives. Prominent among these have been Mahatma Gandhi's *satyagraha* movement and Martin Luther King's civil rights movement. The strength of these movements lay in their organizational power (Boulding 2002:16). Furthermore, both movements fused religious and social imperatives that reaffirmed their moral legitimacy. In both cases, conflict resolution was mandated by large sectors of the Indian, American and international communities. At the same time, the offensive predations of the state and racist individuals were viewed as exploiting the conditions for violence against ordinary people. An interesting feature in both movements was the outward displays of courage by members, particularly among *satyagrahis* who often faced beatings and possible death. From a cultural viewpoint, the moral principles of non-violence serve two functions: binding group members and communities, and "causing violent actors to compare their behaviors with the nonviolence form" (Lopez-Reyes 2002:61). In Gandhi's case, peace making as a non-violent form of conflict resolution was the only way for mustering the moral power of western civilization which he believed would triumph over aggression (Lopez-Reyes 2002:62).

What can we learn from both these peace approaches? Firstly, that there exist coinciding notions of conflict resolution that often exist along side socially sanctioned forms of violence (i.e. killing for one's country, killing in self defense, execution of criminals). The biblical turning of one's cheek against an aggressor as juxtaposed to fighting the 'good fight' is a relevant example of this dichotomy. Secondly, that the decision towards non-violence is often linked to notions of altruism, the 'common good', and an ability towards seeing the social ramifications of continuing violence. A mental map of both peace approaches would analyse how people construe non-violence in certain social contexts, and the factors behind their moral responses. These would include social, religious, philosophical, psychological, political and economic factors which may contribute towards non-violence. In Gandhi's *satyagraha* the following human behaviourome can be constructed:



Essentially, *satyagraha* is a composite of eastern and western religious and philosophical ideals which have been applied in order to increase social awareness of the principles and application of social justice in various social contexts. *Satyagraha* is a holistic approach in that it is a way of living equitably and sustainably. Included in *satyagraha's* approach are spiritual, psychological, economic, communal and ecological themes. Gandhi always stressed that the principles of *satyagraha* had to be undertaken on a personal level in order for them to be realised in the social arena.

Satyagraha's conflict resolution model is characteristic of other cross cultural conflict resolution models in that they use a repertoire of cultural symbols which are ritually organised in order increase their social potency for participants. The use of collective

symbols as Emile Durkheim are powerful psycho-cultural symbols that heighten affective states and group identity (Durkheim 1995). Similarly, Victor Turner emphasises the social effects of symbols and how they are used in various social contexts. Turner argues that ritual symbols are important for maintaining social order (1957, 1969, 1974). For example, in his work, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957) Turner discusses how core cultural symbols are used to alleviate social conflict and preserve social integration among Ndembu members. What is of relevance here is how for Turner an analysis of social disturbances in societies is more insightful of social processes than observing normal conditions (Barrie 1998). Turner (1974) calls the process of social tension and their resolution as "social dramas" which

comprise “four main phases of public action, accessible to observation” (Turner 1974:38) — “breach, crisis, redressive action, and reintegration” (Barrie 1998). The first phase is “signalized by the public, overt breach or deliberate nonfulfillment of some crucial norm regulating the intercourse of the parties (Turner 1974:39). Once a breach occurs “a phase of mounting crisis supervenes” in which the breach increases and “extends the separation between the parties” (Barrie 1998). The crisis stage has “liminal characteristics, since it is a threshold between more or less stable phases of the social process” (Turner, 1974:39).

The redressive action phase functions to limit the extent of the crisis with “certain adjustive and redressive mechanisms . . . [which] are swiftly brought into operation by leading or structurally representative members of the disturbed social system” (Turner 1974:39). Turner identifies the mechanisms of this phase:

They may range from personal advice and informal mediation or arbitration to formal juridical and legal machinery, and, to resolve certain kinds of crisis or legitimate other modes of resolution, to the performance of public ritual. (Turner 1974:39).

Since the redressive phase “is the most liminal” (since conflict resolution may be unsuccessful) a ritual may be required to “resolve the crisis” (Barrie 1998). This allows for the “reintegration to occur” (Barrie 1998). “The reintegration phase involves the resolution of the conflict by reintegrating the disturbed group into society or by the” (Barrie 1998) “social recognition and legitimization of irreparable schism between the contesting parties” (Turner 1974:39). Turner’s ideas are particularly useful for understanding how social actors engage in “social dramas” and develop methods for alleviating social conflict.

Conclusion

This paper has argued how the human behaviouralome may be used as a cross cultural tool for understanding human aggression and for developing moral responses to social conflict. As Macer (2004) contends, the human behaviouralome provides a map of ideas which can assist evolutionary ways of thinking which challenge habituated ways of thinking (Saniotis 2006b). Innard’s assertion that nature’s design leads to co-operation, symbiosis, biological feedback and adaptation are mirrored in human co-operation, concern for social order and promotion of ethical consciousness (2004:88). The widespread phenomenon of human aggression must be understood in relation to what Macer calls “memories” — the biological and cultural aspects of human nature. While we do not know to what extent aggression is informed by human biological and cultural evolution, its characteristics are often prompted by social disruption which diminishes ontological security, which in turn, ensues existential retrieval. However, due to the complexity of the human brain and its social

compliment — society, there are numerous ways in which conflict resolution can be developed and implemented.

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Human death: paradoxes of mortal being (Fedor Dostoevsky and modern bioethical challenges)

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I.

Indeed, one even may say - "death" exists as paradox, more precisely, is given as paradox. Should I die? No, it seems I shouldn't. But if I shouldn't die, should I live?

We fear of death and at the same time, something hidden deeply inside our consciousness forces us to wait for it. As if this final touch of great painter - Nature gives shape to our whole being in the most profound way.

Death is said to be an impossible possibility (Derrida), so we are hopelessly doomed to chat about something we do not absolutely know about, because nobody has such experience "to be dead". And at the same time this impossible possibility is a very familiar to everybody as if everybody knows primordial necessity of death. We need to understand death and at the same it appears we can not say a word without paradoxical implication.

Nevertheless, we feel that this impossible possibility makes impossible to define exactly human death, - each time when we think we come to plausible conclusion apparent coherent death's definition comes apart before our very eyes. But we need exact definition - at least to know when we should finish our earth cares. But even without such annoying question - when shall I die, at least everybody knows about fierce definition of death debates between law, medicine, and patient in our society.

It is funny how people find the definition of death and right answers, - sometimes far from the bed of dying patient in the intensive care unit.

II

It is not easy at once to find a connection between modern Russian political thought and one of the core issues of modern bioethics - brain death debates. The latter is unknown in our country. While Russia passed a Transplant Law in 1992 and has a brain death protocol, we do not even define more precisely in mass-media whether this Russian "brain death" is a "whole brain death" or "high brain death". Only professionals know that this is a "whole brain death" criteria. But philosophers do not know anything about such dilemmas. And one may decide the connection between brain death debates and soviet collapse has nothing in common, except medical terminology: "brain death" and "collapse". But, do not jump to a conclusion.

Looking at the history of brain death's concept or definition of death debates it is very easy to recognize the very history of the last Russian decade. Perhaps "Soviet death" seems just metaphor, but believe me, there is nothing metaphorical at all. That was real, actual death of the whole political system. But what a strange situation - as if all died but nobody was dead. Likewise the patient is considered "brain dead", but breathing and heart beating persist.

Perhaps this sounds as extravagant implication, but now the definition of historical death is as much complicated as definition of death in modern medicine. "Whole brain death", "brainstem death", "neocortical death" is the "fuzzy set" of controversies as like as August 1991 and Soviet collapse, destruction of Communist Party Central Committee and KGB, privatization in the nineties. Really, nobody can define exactly the moment of Soviet death and what does it mean - death of the whole historical epoch, as like medicine encounters definition of death controversies each time when "brain death" is determined or organ's retrieval is needed. Like as some of those involved in organ donation subjectively believe that their organ donors are not really dead, the majority of soviet people subjectively believe that Soviet society is not really dead so that in conscience they view themselves as participating in what amounts to societal approved historical homicide (epochicide). As if the main task was to harvest social organs for transplantation from dead historical subject - soviet communism - to newly born liberal democratic historical subject.

Indeed, who may exactly determinate the time of death of political system? Do orange revolutions mean the death of old social order or can we say that modern Iraq war means the death of Hussein dictatorship or, in other words, means an outset of liberal revelation? Does the current "post-orange" crisis in Ukraine means we have missed something very important in understanding of the course of political and social life? Is Russia a brain-dead pregnant woman and our community only want to deliver the newborn in 2008 and then withdraw the life-support system?

So, perhaps in this sense there is a paradoxical implication, that we Russians understand very well this issue - is brain death a conventional one or not? Death always was conventional and nothing more. Is the brain death concept a cunning invention of transplants only for harvesting human organs? Perhaps, it is. Perhaps it is not. But then answer- is biological death criteria a cunning invention of those who are afraid to take responsibility for their decision?

At last, whether we really determine a real death under the mask of brain death or we simply kill brain dead patient, lies the most guileful question. It seems to me that the main difference between two concepts of death is as follows: Who takes responsibility for determination of death - Her Majesty Nature or physician? Who takes

responsibility for destruction, for devastation of Soviet Union – Russian liberals or Her Majesty History?

So, there will be something more important through our comparative analyses. First, now post-Soviet Russia is a place in the modern world where the death of the whole national order, former eternal order is accessible for people, for social consciousness in the whole. Second by far, - looking at the post-Soviet space, one must admit we have a unique opportunity to have such an incredible experience – as if “brain dead” patient is able to think over his death and decide ultimately what does it mean – “brain death”. Moreover, post-soviet society must define and determine the philosophical, political, social and personal meaning of death - these are tasks of their everyday life.

Not outer observers, but the brain dead patient himself may question his own death. And, at the same time, the modern conception of “brain death” gives us the possibility to look at dying history from absolutely new point of view, so to speak, to sketch a concept of social “brain death”; second, to understand at long last, that though the death is a cultural phenomenon, nevertheless this is real death. What is more important - “social brain death” status doesn’t allow him to avoid questioning death or turn questioning into the funny philosophical play. Only now we can answer the question: Where is the death of modern man? Where can we find the person’s death as processes?

So, an intrinsic thread between two opposite currents, the crucial point of possible dialog between two different cultural worlds is as follows – simply “death”, or “human death” from the philosophical point of view.

And here arises another paradox. The only thing which is accessible for us now is the mere statement – death is absolutely another entity than life. And we only guess we know what we say about. We have not any coherent conception of death. “Whole brain death”, “brainstem death”, “high brain death”, “biological death”, “personal death” – it seems that human death is a mere juxtaposition of various definitions. Why we have so many definitions? Everybody knows that each person has only one death and for what do we need so many deaths? Perhaps we do need to avoid the real answer. We do not want to see real death.

III

I should confess from the very beginning – I do not like a dialog between bioethics and modern philosophy - because this dialog reminds of a conversation between the deaf and dumb. Really, it is said that philosophy is a reflection on death or begins with the question of death. And definition of death, search for meaning of death is one of the most important issue of bioethics. It seems that these two currents of modern culture must understand each other very well but actually do nothing of this kind. The philosophical mainstream disregards definition of death debates to such an extent that it pays

no attention to the modern bioethical search for meaning of death. Philosophy simply keeps silence at best. Or simply said that these debates are of no importance at worst. Philosophy doesn’t see anything new for itself – no new death such as brain death, and hence no new meaning. Truly speaking, one should admit that philosophical mainstream is right.

But on the other hand, bioethics disregards the philosophical mainstream as well. Bioethics simply keeps silence at best. Or simply it says, that such definitions of death as “personal death” or “social death” or “historical death” are nothing but metaphors. Certainly one should admit that bioethics is right too.

I don’t like the awkward stance of philosophers although I am a philosopher myself. Yes philosophy likes to play with words and especially to play with such words as “death”, “dead”, “mortality” and at the same time philosophy understands that there is a real, actual death – biological one as like as bioethics understands that it is absolutely impossible to define death out of social or personal context.

It is taken for granted that biological death is a real actual death for both bioethics and philosophy. For example, when Truog ask a question “Isn’t time to abandon brain death” the answer is – we must return to the traditional concept of human death – biological death. When philosophers are tired to play with words, they usually say – well, there is actual real death – the biological one and this is the main question. Moreover, biological death is a symbol of reconciliation for our multicultural world. And we often say – biological death is a traditional death. Is it true? What does it mean?

Let us look more attentively at this question. Biological death is the same cultural construction as brain death. I mean first of all the concept of biological death. It emerged not so long ago – about four centuries ago. It was finally put into shape by the Age of Enlightenment. There is a great contradiction in the very definition of biological death. Likewise in the case of brain death, we have here at least two deaths – biological and unknown human death. In other words, human death may step out only under a biological mask. So we have here a well known contradiction – this is the death of biological organism, but where is human death? Modern medicine can not resolve the problem – if brain death is equal to human death where is the death of a person?

Moreover, it seems that brain death is an upgraded biological one. I mean first of all concepts of death. “Death as the cessation of the life of the person, the irrevocable cessation of consciousness, the end of organismic integration, the cessation of whole brain functions and so forth, are different determinations” but are the same definition – the end of biological life. Death exists as a mockery of Nature. And if death has no place, no time, no meaning, and then it can be easily eliminated. So, there are different tests, criteria for determination of different deaths. But we have the same

concept. In comparison, for example, with religious conception of death neither biological death nor brain death has meaning.

Biological death exists as a great metaphor and we do not even notice that when saying – “personal”, “social”, “historical” death are metaphors, but biological – this is a real death, right death. “Death is a strictly biological concept, applicable only to the human organism but not a person”. Medicine disregards philosophy and at the same time plays with the pure metaphor.

So if both a person’s death and biological death are metaphors, from my point of view, that is the first question - really who was the first who designated human death as a biological one? For what? Biological death appeared as an instantaneous event, mathematical point, and therefore illusory event that has not any place, any time and thus has no meaning for human being. So from the very beginning, it was absolutely impossible moreover unnecessary for man to set or determine the moment of death – that was the Nature’s concern. As if biological death was a symbol of immortality for post-Christian humans. But who was this person – post-Christian human?

IV.

Sometimes it seems that philosophy is considered to be a large box with dusty books and everybody may find whatever one likes at any time. Thus you may find in any book about definition of death issues references to any philosophical school of thought, so that one may suppose that death as a fundamental dimension of human beings existed from the outset of human history. But as Hegel pointed out, men in general don’t exist, what exists is always a person of a definite time and at a definite place. The same is amount to human death – death in general doesn’t exist. Human death is a heavy cultural construction and always was.

And at the same time it is very convenient, very easy to find in this box a dusty book we want to forget and throw away or hide from the eyes of young generation. And one may understand why - we trust in the list of book’s titles more than we trust in our memory, in our historical conscience. In such case the history only serves our ambitions and we may treat it anyway one likes.

There happened a historical event when it had become absolutely impossible to avoid questioning one’s own sources – for example, when a whole epoch collapsed and people are doomed to understand the absence of their own place in the historical current. To be sure, issues of human death arose as the only path to explain to ourselves the meaning of the Soviet collapse, the meaning of person’s death – really it was absolutely impossible to separate the fate of epoch and the fate of individual. So, we were condemned to return to our sources and following our historical conscience we may reach the truth. Certainly we look for the meaning of

life. Certainly we look for traditions, thinkers, writers which may help us to find solution for our present disastrous situation.

But, alas, looking in the past, we found only death as a mockery of great history. Indeed, death was a creative power in the XX-th century. The new historical epoch of superman in the Europe (or mangod in Russia) required the death of the old one. We called this historical movement “an epoch of God’s death” (Heidegger). The first steps of new immortal humanity in the shade of “dead God” were the rush of murders in the first half of the XX-th century both in world wars and in the reality of the political systems of communism and fascism.

No philosophical school could do without death as well. Moreover, death was a fundamental dimension of human beings. To be human beings meant to be mortal. I do not want to list the works of continental philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Unamuno, Jaspers, for example. What is more important is that death had a particular meaning – properly speaking, that was not death in modern sense of this word, - all kinds of quiet, ordinary death in one’s own bed in the family circle were placed in one domain and were designated as natural or I would prefer “non-heroic death”. Philosophy held natural death in contempt. Philosophy accepted only the sacrifice or threat of to be killed or death as possible terminal situation, a right death for heroes, for soldiers, for dissidents, for those who were in opposition to dictatorship.

This set of heroic deaths is rejected by history itself, at least now we consider the meaning of this heroic death as to be out of use. Times had passed away. No world wars, no revolutions. The postindustrial epoch had come, or, in other words, there was the triumph of a consumer society. Nobody wanted to die in the name of great ideologies.

But there is another deeper level of understanding of the meaning of death and looking attentively at the history of twentieth century, which we comprehend that traditional image of heroic death only obscures the primordial idea of God’s death epoch.

“Why should I die?” – yes, this is a starting point, a fundamental question for whole western philosophy. It is this question that gave birth to great schools of thought. Certainly, any heroes may ask “Why should I die?” and find an answer, but there was a person who knew the horrible meaning of new human death and said:

- “I am bound to shoot myself because the highest point of my self-will is to kill myself with my own hands.”

- “But you won’t be the only one to kill yourself; there are lots of suicides.”

- “With good cause. But to do it without any cause at all, simply for self-will, I am the only one.”

And he had committed suicide simply for self-will. Who committed that highly unusual suicide? Where did he come from?

V.

This man was one of the main heroes of Dostoevsky's novel "The Possessed". Certainly, Kirillov is a kind of "self-portrait, depicting the writer's metaphysical "I" in its association with the other worlds. For the sake of fairness it should be noted that speaking about various manifestations of Dostoyevsky's "I" we do not mean it literally but rather as the writer's literary shadows, existing relatively independently" (V. Bachtin).

Kirillov is known to be a logical suicide for the whole Russian and western culture. He said before committing suicide that "in his suicidal note he would like to curse everything and draw an ugly mug with a sticking tongue to the world" (V. Bachtin). It is considered that his horrible fate is an ominous symbol for those who believed in God's death, who decided that one must follow one's own way without the aid of universal, divine standards, who decided to destroy old Christian world and replace God with new strong overman (or as Dostoevsky said – mangod).

To be sure, it is very easy to consider Kirillov's metaphysics in traditional terms of the philosophy of last century and there were a lot of interpretations of miserable logic. One of the most famous is of Albert Camus. He not only rejected the philosophy of suicide, but stated - "This idea that I am, my way of acting as if everything were meaningful ... all this is dizzily belied by the absurdity of a possible death".

But I think that important points of logical suicide's reasoning had been omitted, even neglected. Let me remind his well-known words:

- "If there is no God, then I am God."

- "There, I could never understand that point of yours: why are you God?"

- "If God exists, all is His will and from His will I cannot escape. If not, it's all my will and I am bound to show self-will."

Death as absurd – this is a main issue, a main concern for modern man. Here lies the great paradox of modern understanding of the meaning of human death. Precisely speaking, death has no meaning, no time and no place. Yes, we have absolutely rejected this suicide logic, although we admitted it without questioning during WW II - not so long ago. But now, now we condemn suicide bombers, terrorism and can not absolutely understand "rational", so to say, premises of such modern suicide logic. It is not surprising – each civilized man should condemn terrorism, certainly, not because death is an absurd. No. This suicide logic overrides liberal human values, kills innocent people and is a worst way for resolving any kind of international and domestic conflicts. But let's confess ourselves – we reject any death now, even natural one.

Yes, we say that death is the inevitable outcome of everybody's life; one may accept imminent death with dignity, with calm, and one may not. But perhaps

nobody admits that human death is not only an inevitable final event, but a necessary process for any human being. Yes, we are direct descendants of God's death epoch. And nothing gives us a right to judge from above an epoch of which we are completely a part - Camus was right. Yes, we need immortality, and as habitants of consumer societies, we hate the very thought about our death.

We are reluctantly aging, although one may not separate aging and event of death – perhaps the meaning of human death is inseparable from the meaning of aging. Who can not die, and never can be born. Questioning the meaning of death one should questioning the meaning of aging. Certainly, it is absolutely impossible to understand social interactions between old and young generations without understanding of necessity of human death. Yes, this necessity is the threat of modern consciousness.

And it is this necessity of death that is the pivotal idea of logical suicide's philosophy. But this is unusual death, unordinary death, - Kirillov meant by that the necessity is self-death. Really, self-death means that as Kirillov cried: "all will has become mine. Can it be that no one in the whole planet, after making an end of God and believing in his own will, will dare to express his self-will on the most vital point?"

So, death is an eventual event of the human being's becoming, so the processes of aging, dying, death itself are intrinsic processes of a person. They could not be eliminated in some or other way. So, self-death is a necessary final process of human life which begins with first signs of aging. And only as a self-death the human death gains its meaning. Surely, I do not mean by self death some kind of suicide. In no way, - I want to emphasize this once more. As if Kirillov felt himself of our doubts and added:

"Now I am only a god against my will and I am unhappy, because I am *bound* to assert my will".

But he was sure, that "If you recognize it (self-death – S.R.) you are sovereign, and then you won't kill yourself but will live in the greatest glory."

And then Kirillov added the most important words for us: "I will begin and will make an end of it and open the door, and will save. That's the only thing that will save humankind and will re-create the next generation physically; for with his present physical nature humans cannot get on without his former God, I believe". Here arises the main idea of terrible logic – the idea of the human limit without God, a limit which abhors all extremes. This is the hidden fundamental idea of "logical suicide".

Really, let's look at the history of God's death which went back to the Renaissance. Death was a punishment imposed by Christian God. It is original sin that was the main limit of human creatures in the face of Christian

God. "The fact that the life has an end is not overlooked, but this end never coincides with physical death. It depends on the unknown state of the beyond. Between the moment of death and the moment of survival there is an interval that Christianity, like the other religions of salvation, has extended to eternity. But in the popular mind, the idea of infinite immortality is less important than the idea of an extension. In our first model the afterlife is essentially a period of waiting characterized by peace and repose (вечный покой). In this state the dead wait, according to the promise of the church, for what will be the true end of life, the glorious resurrection and life of the world to come".

But as Aries pointed, gradually "Hell was abandoned.... Along with the hell went sin....It was no longer regarded as a part of human nature but as social problem that could be eliminated....Evil still exists but outside of man.... But if there is no evil, what do we do about death?"

What do we do about death without God? Dostoevsky anticipated an answer on this question – certainly, if there is no God, no original sin, hence the only limit of human being would remain the death, but death without former original sins, death on earth, without afterlife, particular one – "self-death". Here is the great difference, the great distance between those who want to eliminate even subtle traits if human death and those who understand – the free human being is possible only as mortal one. Humans aren't born as a mortal being, but become mortal ones. Death necessarily belongs to humans and must belong to us. That is why I have dwelled so long on this logical suicide's philosophy. Certainly such interpretation of Dostoevsky's thoughts is our modern vision, or I would prefer to say – post-Soviet dimension of human existence. But it has been said yet, that "what Nietzsche said with regard to the death of God in the nineteenth century is true of much of ethic and political theory in the twentieth"². I began with implication that there is not great distance between bioethical controversies and modern Russian thought. In both cases we look for understanding of death but have to understand the limits of human power. To understand – what does it mean – human death is to find a way to the essence of man.

So, one needn't to kill oneself to die as a mortal human being. One needn't to destroy the whole order taking an attempt to avoid necessary self-destruction without grief and sorrow. And it is self-death as a basic meaning of mortal being that forces me to give such detailed explanations on logical suicide's philosophy.

VI.

Vladimir Bachinin noted that Dostoyevsky possessed a metaphysical vision and ear that were exceptionally sharp and penetrating. Incredible logic! Especially for us now. As if he was absolutely sure that descendants of God's death epoch would inevitably encounter this paradox of human existence in some or other way: why humans himself should die? Why everything should come to an end to give the way to new generations, new cultures? Are there limitations of boundless human power? As if Dostoevsky forestalled biotechnological developments of next century, as if he foresaw dilemmas we would encounter now, as if he anticipated person's death controversies, bioethical debates on euthanasia. Really, it doesn't matter whether we say about the collapse of communism or about modern limitless developments of modern technologies or about environmental issues, ecological disasters. Certainly, we say about an idea of human limits – this is the main problem of our time.

We have destroyed all limits: of *Homo sapiens*, of history, of cultures; we are even able to move on only across boundaries, we understand each other only from within an interdisciplinary perspective; we have challenged the biosphere; we may be cloning; we destroyed death as unitary phenomenon and it is possible now to confront natural death. That was the demand of consumer society and we strive to deprive humans of their own death by all means. No doubt the current mania about health is but another manifestation of unease with death, but this is only the first step. We look for technologies which may help us to eliminate aging, dying and death itself. The whole trend of our consciousness has been changed; it has led society to behave as if death may not exist.

Can we stop ourselves in the cultural world which has lost all human limits? Bioethics appeared first of all as an attempt to find new, perhaps, strict moral rules for biotechnological developments. But very soon we came to understanding that we are witnesses of a clash of different cultural orders, and new image of human being is at stake. Are we aware of our limitless power? Or, in other words, are we aware that we can not do even one step without setting a new cultural and personal limits? Let me reiterate – could we stop ourselves? I do not mean we must to kill ourselves, certainly, I don't. There was a first person who opened the door for us, for future generations. I mean, first of all not logical suicide who lived on old book pages, but Russian writer who was not afraid of following a horrible turn of reasoning and foresaw modern dilemmas, modern controversies of new man's birth.

All our post-Christian history was a history of overcoming of human limits. The very thought about possible death humiliate of free, strong all-sufficient man. And only when we have encountered the final limits of our existence – environmental disasters, global

² Fashioning an Ethic for life and death in post-modern society. H. Tristram Engelhardt in *Arguing euthanasia. The controversy over mercy killing, assisted suicide, and the "right to die"*, edited by J.D. Moreno.

terror war or the final limits of cultural existence – I mean collapse of communism’s epoch, we have been able to come back and find the roots of our boundless self-will. Not only to find, but to see from other perspective modern developments, modern paradoxes, and the Grand one – a human death.

Let’s take seriously our fantasies. Such metaphor “self-death” is a science-fiction alike. Let it be. Either biological death or brain death is the same metaphor. Perhaps we are sketching now a new cultural construction – self-limit, self-death of a mortal being. What allows us to make such suggestions? Nothing does. But as Freud would say, nothing prevents us to follow this way of reasoning to find simple answers on complicated questions. Let’s go on. Let’s extend the scope of the meaning of human death to the domain of limits of our power, to self-limit and perhaps then we will find an answer on one of the main question of mortal being – human self-death. More precisely, we will find new paradoxes for sure. But why not?

Narrating Pain: The Role of Medical Humanities

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Abstract

Whoever suffers interprets their pain and incorporates it in a meaningful story. Consequently, understanding others’ pain entails fusing together personal horizons, as when reading a text. Medical humanities play an important role in palliative care education: they focus our emotional intelligence, allowing us to discern meaning in a dilemma and assess it ethically. In particular, good-quality cinema can open up entirely new viewpoints in its descriptions of reality and professionals’ sense of their own identity.

In the film, *The Belly of an Architect* (Italy-United Kingdom 1987, directed by Peter Greenaway, featuring Brian Dennehy), an American architect named Stourley Kracklite, who has come to Rome to set up an exhibition dedicated to a famous architect, is dying. His abdominal pain becomes increasingly acute and frequent; the colonoscopy leaves little room for doubt. Yet it is not the biological aspects of colon cancer that concern Kracklite. His interest lies in Rome, his personal project, and the fight against conflicting interests that are killing his dream exhibition like a metastasis. He is searching for meaning, something on which to devote his last energy. He is seeking a symbol of life, something

permanent that represents hope, even in a check-mate situation.

With regard to the tumour itself, the architect seeks a vision and narrative of it. To this end, he starts photocopying his stomach; he colours in, draws and reworks endless photocopies. He needs to depict what is happening inside him, not through bio-imaging, but using his own resources: his art, professional style and past studies. He also needs examples, tales of famous illnesses through which he can contemplate from a distance the corruption of beauty and the impact of illness on the dignity and life force of great men. These men are Roman emperors, immortalised in statues. The architect’s doctor understands that this is the level of communication Kracklite needs: thus, the news of his diagnosis is broken to him in these precise terms, in a kind of guided tour of emperors’ busts, the last of which is anonymous and resembles the film’s protagonist.

What happens to this sick man is what happens to us all: pain can be measured, suffering has to be narrated. We know that the distinction between pain and suffering marks concepts which refer to two entities that, in real life, are one and the same. Nonetheless, if this distinction offers us any useful clarification, we can specify that *pain* is not exactly *suffering*, even if pain always causes human beings to suffer. Like all symptoms of somatic illness, *pain* has a physical ingredient that creates psychological and existential resonance. For example, toothache has a bodily location and varying duration. It can be eased or intensified by physical factors or temperature: pressure, heat, cold, etc... On another level, however, toothache is also affected by psychological factors: memories of previous pain, conflictual relationships, anxiety, calm, or placebo effects. The pain felt during illness is always physical, yet it is never *just* physical. Hence, it can be used as a metaphor for that which is not physical: we say for instance that the anguish is the pain of the human existence (as the anxiety is the crying of a mind that hurts).

Furthermore, when pain is felt, it is always *interpreted as part of a meaningful narrative*: pain as punishment or blessing, revelation or disaster, moral challenge or an absurd event. *Suffering* is, precisely, a person’s feelings¹: it is pain experienced as a burden, a trial,

¹ Evidence that suffering inevitably involves the person, i.e., it is the person and not their body parts (dissected and studied by science) that suffers, is developed by E.J. Cassell in *The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991. For more on these concepts, see also P. Cattorini, *La morte offesa. Espropriazione del morire ed etica della resistenza al male*, Bologna, Dehoniane, 1996 (see paragraph “*Vivere senza soffrire. L’ideale analgesico*”). This article, translated in English by Marilena Cairns (translation revised by the Author), was developed for a conference on “Palliative care: certainties and open questions” held in Varese, 24th September 2005, as part of the Master Course on Palliative Care, Università Studi dell’Insubria – Floriani Foundation,

atonement, threat, a contradiction of, and for, our human existence. Hence, suffering can be irrespective of pain or psychological conflict: social discrimination, humiliation, and injustice cause suffering. Suffering is the negative vibration inflicted on a person by harm. This dark, tortuous sensation is not at all proportional to physical harm itself: if there is a reason to endure, a foreseeable deadline to grasp onto, pain is borne better – we could say, causes less suffering. Equally, lesser pain can cause great suffering if given destructive connotations or taken as a precursor of more frightening battles.

Perceived as something that is inside us, pain can be measured, *explained* and treated objectively. Suffering viewed as the human experience of pain, as a feeling of our existence in danger from harm, needs to be *understood*, in a fusion of personal horizons similar to that between a literary text and its reader-interpreter, or that present in the creative process of an artwork or analysis of historical documents. And this is precisely the role of medical humanities. If we ask ourselves what humanistic disciplines in the medical curriculum (biomedical ethics, medical law, history of medicine, medicine & literature, philosophy and theology of medicine, medical sociology, medical psychology, healthcare economy and politics, medical pedagogy, medical anthropology) have in common, we see firstly that they lay the basis for a fundamental, clinical approach: the *verstehen* approach, comprehension from the interior. This entails involvement between the parties concerned and a “feeling inside” (*Einführung*, as it has been named by phenomenologists) which leads the doctor in question back to the patient’s primary experience of illness. As Sartre² writes, before knowing what conjunctivitis is, before identifying the eye as an inflamed body part that is causing pain, it is the reader’s relationship with the world that is shifting: the sheet of paper shakes before him, the letters blur and his vision burns.

Milan and it has been published in a first Italian draft in *Rivista Italiana Cure Palliative*, 2005, n.4. We use in this text the term *harm* to mean not only the physical impact of the disease on the body, but also in a philosophical way, to mean what is common both to harm and to evil (in a moral sense), as when we talk of a negative vibration inflicted on a person both by a cancer and by remorse. Languages, like English or German, that make a distinction between *Wohl/Gut* and *Übel/Böse* pose this linguistic problem.

² J.P.Sartre, *L’être et le néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1943 (Italian translation, *L’essere e il nulla*, Milan, Il Saggiatore, 1980). On page 415 of the Italian translation, the author says that there is an identity between the pain in these eyes and his reading, since the words he is reading remind him every second of his suffering. This suffering can only be identified in reference to the act that it is disrupting or hindering. For the notion of “fusion of horizons” see H.G.Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1960 (Italian translation: *Verità e metodo*, Milan, Bompiani, 1983).

Thanks to this integration of personal horizons, the medical humanities shed light on primary, emotional reactions, even when the clinical focus is on naturalist or unemotional ones³; they challenge purely technical and scientific reductions⁴; spark interest in interdisciplinarity versus super-specialization⁵; and encourage a special approach to the human stories, which lie behind the clinical cases and offer the original evidence (fear, confusion, need of help, hope), that naturalist knowledge and technical expertise, to a certain extent, put aside when planning sectoral and standardized intervention. On the contrary, this is evidence that deserves greater attention, if the clinical aim is a person’s well-being, not simply organ

³ In pharmacology, we recall the “pill” myth, an ahistorical, impersonal, mechanical way of understanding illness and the demand for treatment; in this context, reread the “happy pills” debate on treatment of depression. We should say similar things about the *painkiller myth* and the risk of simply eliminating the experience of pain, at times excluding the sufferer’s personality from full participation in delicate, paradigmatic events of transition and separation (such as illness or childbirth), substituting knowledge and cultural practices of expressing, managing and sharing discomfort with external, technical interventions. In certain cases, this disassociates the bodily experience (a trauma felt by touch but without pain can create a sensitive “hole” which influences self-representation and alters our experience of reality and, as a result, requires further elaboration) and appoints the physician/medical provider as a mediator between the conscious and the bodily self, with the predictable risks of cultural iatrogenesis (in the sense of I. Illich, *Limits to Medicine. The Expropriation of Health*, London, Marion Boyars Publ., 1976 – Italian translation: *Nemesi medica. L’espropriazione della salute*, Milan, Mondadori, 1977). See S. Vegetti Finzi, “L’analgesia epidurale e il senso del dolore nel parte”, in *L’Arco di Giano*, 2001, summer, 28, pp.19 & following. For every commendable “pain-free hospital” programme, we should ask ourselves, “At what cost? With how much “customer” awareness? With what foreseeable psychological and cultural consequences?” See also our article, “Palliazione, mito analgesico ed eutanasia”, in *Rivista Italiana Cure Palliative*, 2002, no. 2, pp. 116 & following.

⁴ Think of the speed with which, at times, biotechnical interventions deal with infertility problems. This risks a rapid shift to reproduction that devalues an understanding of the human reasons that could be at the heart of the problem, preventing an interpretation of sterility that may express “a conflicting desire, a wish *not* to become a father or a mother that our conscience will not accept”. Think of the difficulty of preparing for a newborn, when the focus is on the impersonal, fragmented technical phases of IVF treatment. For messages found in medical procreation technologies, see paragraph on “La medicina della risposta”, in S. Vegetti Finzi, “Biotecnologie e nuovi scenari familiari”, in *Bioetica*, 1994, no. 1, pp. 60-82.

⁵ Medical Humanities, from the very beginning, pose questions on very general concepts that all specializations use to define their area (think of the notion of illness for medicine), to prevent the significance of these concepts becoming obvious, the object of prejudice, or removed from its historical-cultural roots.

restoration, clearing tubes or repairing internal bodily mechanisms.

Narration is perhaps the royal road to accessing the *illness and care experience* as one that is unique, personal experiences. If we compare the language of clinical cases, the technical speaking of clinical records, with language used by the patient to reconstruct what has happened to them, we have a first, general example of what we neglect (in terms of personal cyphers, beliefs, moral visions) when we apply albeit correct biological methodology and up-to-date nosography. Although the latter are essential for explaining biochemical and pathological dysfunctions, they should be related to the full scope of a human event whenever we need to understand what has happened to a patient and decide on the best course of action. For these reasons and in these key moments, we need to *narrate the story of the illness*. We would recommend: ask the sufferer to tell their story, then you yourself imagine the variations, future scenarios, probable chapters, which together will form this complicated, unpredictable book: a patient's life.

"The patient seeks to 'make sense' of events and to do what is best; autonomy as lived out is not just the exercise of an arbitrary power of choice, but the attempt to choose *well* in the context of one's life-story, with its own plot, aims and values [...] The health care provider can play a crucial role in restoring autonomy by helping the ill person reconstruct meaning in the face of the threat posed by events"⁶

In other words, if patients need an *ally* it is because they want someone who, whilst helping them psychophysically, also helps them to see better, to narrate better, what has happened to them and what will happen in future treatment. Consider, for example, advance directives and the usefulness of a co-narrator (a physician, an ethics consultant, a proxy) who helps come up with alternative human scenarios and, therefore, helps choose the most appropriate treatment and reject inappropriate ones.

Naturally, our previous advice applies to the people around the patient, too. *Tell your own story* as a doctor, a palliative care expert, a nurse or relative. Indeed, the absurdity of the harm that afflicts one person is that it changes everyone's lives. It shakes our faith to the core and forces us to ask ourselves those few questions that really count: Why go on living? How far should treatment go? Is there any hope in the face of despair? Whom should we thank for unexpected cures?

In this way, narration can drive, and become a symbol of, a *transformation of clinical practice*, one that is limited neither to the terminal phase of illness nor to pathological conditions that are impossible to cure.

Narrative can be a resource not only for palliative care, even if the palliative movement has been one of the leaders in carrying a liberating message and in keeping open a new path for the history of medicine that, hopefully, will withstand disparagement and compromise. We cannot accept a compromise where the anthropological view and the narrative shift, which the palliative treatment movement desired and created, concerns only hopeless situations, while the rest of medicine (which manages daily pain and discomfort in perfectly treatable illnesses) is authorised to continue with cold, impersonal, purely technical ways. We cannot accept a caring, humanist citadel for the dying, supported by some enlightened (even poetic) consultants, in exchange for a crowded, healthcare metropolis with high-pressure working conditions or bereft of any genuine communication. In place of this kind of disassociation, we would prefer the "dissolution" of the palliative care movement, a chemical-biological dissolution that would pave the way for its molecular penetration, its challenge to the medical establishment, and acceptance by general medicine and different medical specializations⁷.

The narrative correction of knowledge and practices also concerns *bioethics*, since narration (as Ricoeur writes) is the laboratory of moral judgement. When we form moral judgement, we think of actions, the significance of which can only be understood if taken *in their historical context*. Without its con-text, a text (be it legal, literary or religious) is incomprehensible or deceptive. So every action is, in its own way, a text to be read and interpreted⁸. To understand meaning, we must consider in synthetic manner the many *elements* that comprise the text: object, intention, circumstances, consequences. These elements are aspects of a single action and when, for expediency, we look at them individually, we extract them from their context. Moral judgement, however, must consider an action in its *entirety*, not just one of its components.

To this end, it is useful to recall the event as a whole, the entire context of an act, because in this way we are forced to reconstruct and integrate critically a single vision that encompasses the numerous details and elements broken down by analysis. Placing an *act within*

⁷ Compare Anonymous, "'La nuova SICP al lavoro' ma di che lavoro si tratta? Osservazioni su un recente editoriale", *Bioetica*, 2004, no. 3, p. 446.

⁸ For analogies between text and action, see P. Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action*, Paris Seuil, 1986 (Italian translation, *Dal testo all'azione. Saggi di ermeneutica*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1989). See also our introduction in P. Cattorini, *Bioetica e cinema. Racconti di malattia e dilemma morali*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 2003. The following texts remain relevant today: G. P. Baisin, *Malattie letterarie*, Milan, Bompiani, 1976 and J. Good Byron, *Medicine, Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994 (Italian translation, *Narrare la malattia. Lo sguardo antropologico sul rapporto medico-paziente*, Turin, Edizioni di Comunità, 1999).

⁶ D. Leder, *Toward a Hermeneutical Bioethics*, in E.R. Du Bose - R. Hamel - L.J. O'Connell, Eds., *A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics*, Valley Forge, Trinity Press, 1994, p. 248.

a story forces us to answer questions such as: Who is the subject of the action? Why did they do it, and under what pressure? What are the foreseeable consequences? What environment, circumstances and relationships do these consequences affect? What emotional (not just intentional or cognitive) components dictate to that way of reacting or working? What other moral and psychological conflicts shape that decision, and what future responsibilities will it entail?

So, to identify the best, most appropriate gesture, we turn, intentionally or otherwise, to *aesthetic categories*. We do not simply consider which behaviour (out of the range of alternatives) maximizes pleasure and minimizes suffering, nor which behaviour adheres most to our moral theory or principles (as if it were a deductive syllogism). Instead, we ask what the *most beautiful* action is, that is, whatever ensures the most coherent progression or conclusion of our human experience. We ask ourselves about the most appropriate lifestyle choice, the one closest to the promise that has constructed our moral identity (the *ipse* that we truly are)⁹. Events progress as though we had to write a new chapter in a book, add another brushstroke to a painting, or come up with a convincing ending to a film which still lacks coherence.

We may well ask ourselves if what we are talking about is simply an external, quite incidental, union of ethics (which would justify rationally the universal dimension of our moral principles) and aesthetics (which would identify the specific ways in which we implement those principles in particular, complicated, vital situations). We believe the answer is no. There is a narrative value in the theories that guide us, just as there is a rational value in the aesthetic distinction between biographical alternatives. Taking it further, we would say that *every ethical theory* is to an *original story or vision* what reason is to faith. Indeed, ethical theory is a clearer, more disciplined, conceptual transcription of a narrative on the ultimate meaning of things, a narrative accepted as truth before being formulated in rational,

⁹ R. Dworkin, *Life's Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom*, New York, Knopf, 1993 (Italian translation, *Il dominio della vita. Aborto, eutanasia e libertà individuale*, Milan, Edizioni di Comunità, 1994) correctly recalls that in end-of-life bioethical choices, we worry about the effect that the final stage will have on a person's entire life, just as we would worry about the conclusion of an artwork, an artistic text, or the final scene of a play (Italian translation, p. 275). Life cannot be judged only impersonally by balancing pleasure and satisfaction with sorrow and frustration, calculating an overall net outcome (p. 36). It has rather to be evaluated as though we were criticising a bad ending that ruins an entire piece of literature that we had enjoyed until then. The Latin terms *ipse* and *idem* are used by P. Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1990 - Italian translation: *Sè come un altro*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1993, to distinguish the selfhood and the sameness in dealing with the issue of personal identity.

impelling form¹⁰. The ethics of rights and consequences rest on a radical option, a vision of humankind, which allows us to distinguish real rights from false ones, essential goods from renounceable ones, and, finally, to balance rights with duties. If we decide to calculate the consequences of an action, we must already have the measuring units to balance them and must possess the criteria with which to interpret the meaning of the action, and the visual capacity for marking its boundaries compared with other actions and their circumstances and consequences. When ethics is limited to the logical analysis of terms and semantic deduction from principles to rules, the outcome has already been decided: we have already chosen a vocabulary to describe ourselves and the world, the plot of our biography, our vision of a good life and myth of our origins¹¹. Therefore, *narrative and philosophy* are not separate when dealing with ethical questions. Narratives are the way in which manifestations of good appear to our consciousness, as if tied by a thread to a tale or myth. We do not create or arbitrarily form these manifestations: we follow them, reflect back upon them and expand upon their different meanings. We look for connections between different symbols of good; we imagine a narrative for their origin and fate, challenge their relevance and respond freely to the demands which life, in this surprising disclosure of meaning, makes on us.

As we said earlier, we need narrative to understand our own suffering and that of others. This statement is clearer now and justifies the presence of narrative elements in the numerous clinical and medical

¹⁰ In this respect, we refer to W.T. Reich, *Alle origini dell'etica medica: mito del contratto o mito di cura?*, in P. Cattorini – R. Mordacci, Eds., *Modelli di medicina. Crisi è attualità dell'idea di professione*, Milan, ESU, 1993, pp. 35-60. All main approaches to ethics –Reich says, and we reformulate in our way - are rooted, usually implicitly, in a fundamental narration that can be called an *original story* [or germinal story, in the sense of a story about the origin and moral role of human persons in the world], a story that provides grounds or a setting for ethical theory. A story that gives images and words, from which theories extract general concepts and principles. To the story-of-origin must the theoretical framework come back, whenever the meaning of concepts and principles seem confused or ambiguous in their applying to morally dilemmatic cases.

¹¹ R. Rorty takes an interesting position in *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989 (Italian translation, *La filosofia dopo la filosofia*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1990, with Preface by Aldo G. Gargani). The key, moral debate does not entail ascribing an unequivocal theoretical foundation to an assertion; it lies in comparing different vocabulary, expanding the range of perspectives, identifying new moral ties and showing the ability to identify the actors involved. Given that anything can appear bad or good after a new, different description, a confrontation between assessment and narrative, moral and aesthetic, is not very useful (see pages 90, 166 and 167 of the Italian translation).

humanities modules that form general healthcare training. A number of recent Masters courses have focused also on *narration and cinema*. Why carry out such training systematically? In great stories of illness, including in film, we see conflicts between values, world visions, notions of illness and health, and medical or scientific ideals. The viewer is invited to form an opinion, to confirm or criticize the logic of the solution put forward by the director, to discuss their theories with others. This apparently simple debating exercise offers the opportunity to improve knowledge of concepts, ethical theories and our capacity for pluralist dialogue. At the same time, it develops our familiarity with cinematic language and narrative analysis, sharpening our perception of the implied emotional dimension.

Good quality cinema has become an important resource in educating the general public, since it involves the viewer directly in the heart of complicated situations. It describes society, group experiences and strong personal emotions. It opens up new viewpoints in its descriptions of reality and humankind, and develops with narrative precision alternative choices about which we have to make decisions in real life. Cinema, like literature as a whole, challenges general moral theories. Cinematic fiction provides a more faithful interpretation of the meaning of actions, stories and attitudes about which ethics express sound, rational, comprehensible assessments. Aesthetic language, moral knowledge, ethical narrative and cinematographic critique interact spontaneously, with all-round benefits¹².

Let us conclude with another literary proposal. In his maritime novel, *The Nigger of the "Narcissus"* (1897), Joseph Conrad describes an extreme relationship against the metaphysical backdrop of a beautiful, innocent sea¹³. On board the *Narcissus* is a black man, James Wait – known as Jimmy – who is seriously ill. Jimmy is deluded, failing to recognise his condition. He is inactive, while the rest of the crew runs the ship. Forced increasingly to isolate himself in his cabin, the latter becomes the ship's ambiguous place. It is a feared room, inhabited by terminal disease, yet it is also a place for fascinating encounters, kind visits, and words of pity. Thus, the boat that contains this "hospice" becomes a theatre for myriad responses to great harm, one that travels with the healthy: terror, prayer, irony, companionship, solidarity and contempt. Another character on board, Donkin, confesses that looking at Jimmy is exasperating and exhausting, because the sick man belongs neither to death nor life. Jimmy ignores both and the situation threatens to drag on endlessly: in other words, an immoral affair.

We need stories like Conrad's to reflect on the importance of our healthcare institutions and imagine ourselves, as healthcare providers, in extreme care

experiences, faced with the looming, inevitable separation from the patient. We also need these stories to speculate on what identity, relations and actions we can offer once palliative treatment is over, before we move on to our next commitment, a new voyage with the suffering. In Jimmy's case too, although foreseen by the crew, death still comes as a terrible surprise. The sailors had not realised fully how powerful their faith was in the illusions Jimmy provided. The sick man's denial had spread to the entire crew, now shaken by his death as though an ancient belief that had formed the foundations of their community had been shattered.

Being with a sick person generates stories by everyone, with benefits to all, in a common quest for meaning¹⁴. Together, these stories structure our lives and colour our hopes. *We are the stories* we believe in.

Biotechnology and Soul

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A recent book by Lee M. Silver (reviewed by Goldman, 2006) presents arguments strongly against anti-biotechnology thinkers. The book is not available to me, but the review by Goldman, nicely done, presents quite a vivid picture of the book's contents, frequently quoting Silver's own words. Hence I may safely express my comments on this publication.

Silver says, "compared with every other field of scholarship and science.....the least compatible with spiritual beliefs". But the distinction between spirituality and science should be clearly appreciated. While spirituality is based on abstract ideas embodied in different religions, sciences are a rational and empirical approach to understand things and phenomena around us. The two represent two different approaches of human mind, and it is futile to search for compatibility between them. I have outlined my views about science and religion elsewhere (Verma, 2006).

Silver says, "human nature will remake all Mother Nature". This is a too optimistic and unrealistic dream. Much remains to be understood and made clear

¹² We resume concepts expressed in our publication, *Bioetica e cinema*, op cit.

¹³ Italian translation, *Il Negro del "Narciso"*, Milan, Mondadori, 2003 (collection: *I Capolavori di J. Conrad*)

¹⁴ There is a thought provoking analysis in G. C. Zapparoli – E. Adler Segre, *Vivere e morire. Un modello di intervento con i malati terminali*, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1997, on the possibilities of personalised, psychotherapeutic treatment (known as orthotanasia) for seriously ill patients, some in terminal stages, designed to help develop an illusionary zone which replaces reality. In this direction, we can state that "the dreams produced by a terminal patient can be used as a personal 'rite of passage'" (Zapparoli, ibidem: p. 64)

about Mother Nature. For example, community structure, detailed role of constituent populations in maintenance of a community, whether there is life elsewhere in the Universe, and, if it is there, in what way the extraterrestrial life is related to the life on our planet, reality and extent of panspermia, that is drifting of life from the outer space to the Earth etc. are still unsolved problems.

The author of the book talks of 'tension' between religion and science. Such a tension is unnecessary, if it is realized that the two are non-overlapping areas with no possibility or hope of intermingling of the two in foreseeable future.

Silver remarks, "Mysticism, however, does survive in some people who have enough scientific training to know better.". This is an underestimation; a large section of scientists are religious. About 40% of US scientists believe in God, but "Collins (a leading molecular geneticist, heading the National Human Genome Project of USA) says, "that is not reflected in science's public face"" (Editorial, 2006). Dawkins (as reviewed by Krauss, 2006) pleads strongly to give up faith in God. But views of his predecessor, Steven Weinberg, who was also a critic of religion, are more moderate and more reasonable. As Krauss (2006) has mentioned, Weinberg "has nevertheless suggested that most scientists simply don't spend enough time even thinking about God or religion to merit the label of atheist."

As pointed out by Goldman (2006), "Silver thinks that one day the difference (between the gene sets of chimpanzee and humans) will boil down to a few dozen genes, kind of "soul code"". Perhaps Silver is not aware of this that, as per Hindu religious philosophy, soul or 'atman' or the life force is present in all forms of life, including chimpanzees. In fact, according to this philosophy, the soul is immortal and passes from one level of organization to another. Besides, in view of the same arrangement of nucleotides, the same genetic code, similar enzyme systems in all organisms, the same detailed structure of cellular organelles, such as mitochondria, in all Eukaryotes, and the recent discovery that more than 7000 genes are in common in man and the very distant relative a sea urchin (as reported in a series of studies, published in the journal *Science*, Reuters news, dated 10th Nov. 2006), it is difficult to accept that 'soul' is the sole property of the human species.

Silver thinks that there is no defensible reason for conservation of species. It is true that species have been going extinct throughout Earth's history. But the author has not taken into account the fact that, due to human interference, the rate of extinction has been greatly accelerated. We are aware of growing rate of extinction of macrofauna, i.e. mammals, birds, reptiles etc.. But generally we are not aware of the very rapid loss of microflora and microfauna through spread of human civilization. As E. O. Wilson (1987), a leading

invertebrate conservationist, has pointed out, "When a valley in Peru or an island in the Pacific is stripped of the last of its native vegetation, the result is likely to be extinction of several kinds of birds and a dozen of plant species...but what is not perceived is that hundreds of invertebrate species will also vanish.". Invertebrates play a very significant role in pollination and in recycling of organic waste in the soil and water, and when they vanish, macroflora and macrofauna will also be wiped out; hence need for conservation efforts.

The whole writing of Silver appears strongly biased in favour of biotechnology, ignoring problems of nature and life on our planet.

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Consequentialism and Climate Change Policy: An Exploratory Paper

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1. Climate Change Policy

The issue of climate change is one of the most encompassing and complex issues facing the international community today. Climate change is defined as the alteration of climate patterns beyond its natural variability brought about both directly or indirectly by anthropogenic activities. Climate is naturally variable – the durations of our summers and the number of typhoons are not exactly the same year after year. Historically, mean global temperatures have cycled through highs and lows between ice ages. However, climatologists and scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change have projected that mean global surface temperatures will rise by 1.4 to 5.8°C by 2100 relative to the average temperature of the baseline period 1960-90 (IPCC TAR 2001). This projected increase would exceed the range

human civilization has experienced! This global warming is due mainly to a “runaway” or aggravated greenhouse effect, in which anthropogenic activities such as industrialization and the combustion of fossil fuels has lead to the release of a great volume gases which trap infrared radiation in the atmosphere. These gases – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, HFCs and PFCs – are called greenhouse gases (GHGs). The impacts of the global warming caused by GHGs include not only higher mean global temperatures but also modified temperature and precipitation distribution and variability patterns, sea level rise, changes in the vegetation and the productivity of agriculture, and altered frequencies and severity of extreme weather events like hurricanes, storms and droughts.

Climate change is essentially a public good problem in the sense that actions today will affect the climate experience by future generations of all socio-economic classes of all countries (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001). The market sectors vulnerable to climate change include agriculture, coastal development, energy, forestry, fisheries and water. On the other hand, the vulnerable non-market sectors include terrestrial ecosystems, human health, undeveloped coasts and other unmanaged ecosystems. Previous studies have shown that the relationship of market sectors with temperature is potentially hill-shaped. The implication of this is that cooler locations may benefit from the warming through a lengthened annual growing season; however, locations that are already hot will suffer damages (Mendelsohn 2005).

However, climate change remains a controversial issue due to the great uncertainty surrounding scientific research. The climate system is a complex one, involving many nonlinear feedback mechanisms. The study of climate trends requires processing decades to centuries of data in order to separate actual climate change from natural climate variability. Forecasts of the timing and extent of future global warming and its impacts are usually made along different scenarios, depending on assumptions regarding development approaches. It is impossible to know for certain what the actual scenario will be, and this is the challenge in crafting appropriate policies and strategies.

Response to climate change primarily takes two forms: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation means reducing the amount of climate change that occurs by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigation is particularly relevant for industrialized countries that intensively use fossil fuels. The advantage of mitigation is that although only developed countries can make significant emission reductions, the results are felt globally due to atmospheric processes that circulate the air. The atmosphere is “a common sink” for GHG’s, so to speak. Thus, any reduction in GHG’s leads to an overall decrease in global warming is good for everyone.

The principal policy guiding mitigation efforts are the Kyoto Protocol. Under the protocol, industrialized countries – known as the Annex I countries – commit to achieving a certain percentage of emission reductions measured in equivalent tons of carbon dioxide by the year 2012. Collectively, the total amount of reductions of all the Annex-I countries amount to 5.2% below the 1990 carbon dioxide levels. Examples of emission reduction methods include clean and renewable energy projects, energy conservation, methane capture from solid waste, reforestation or afforestation, and air pollution technologies. Developing countries still have no reduction commitments, supposedly to give them an opportunity to industrialize, but can partner with Annex-I countries in helping them fulfill their commitments by hosting emission reduction projects. This is because it is often more cost-effective to establish new cleaner technologies in developing countries than to retrofit all the existing infrastructures in the Annex-I countries. While both developed and developing countries are being mandated by the UNFCCC to create greenhouse gas inventories, the Kyoto Protocol explicitly recognizes the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of the parties to the Protocol and “their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances” (Article 10). The declaration on climate change of the recently concluded 6th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) extended the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” to emphasize the “respective capacities” of the countries involved (Maragay 2006).

Adaptation, on the other hand, means reducing the vulnerability of communities to the changes that do occur by a variety of capacity-building strategies such as research on heat-resistant crops, improved irrigation and construction of dams for agricultural purposes, and promotion of livelihoods that, unlike farming and fishing, are less dependent on the climate variability. Unlike mitigation, there is no one definitive set of strategies for adaptation. Instead, the optimum adaptation strategies depend on the unique context of the community under consideration, and will often have to address the socio-economic and political roots of vulnerability, including poverty. To this end, the UNFCCC is encouraging the least development countries in particular to formulate National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) which contain vulnerability assessment and comprehensive adaptation strategies.

Why is adaptation important if mitigation is possible? Climate change mitigation and adaptation are not mutually exclusive responses. This is because, given the momentum of the climate and the socio-economic system, and the long atmospheric lifetime of GHGs, a certain amount of climate change is unavoidable even if all the countries who ratified the Kyoto Protocol meet their emission reduction targets. Unforeseen events may also occur. The Kyoto Protocol commitments may not be met, or the rate of change may be more rapid or

severe than predicted, in which case, precautionary adaptation may prove beneficial. Climate change policies, then, should aim to determine the right mix of mitigation and adaptation in the face of uncertainty.

Currently, the international community is entering into negotiations regarding the post-2012 scenario. Among the questions that need to be answered is how to address the issue of mitigation, in addition to adaptation, in developing countries. In light of this second round of negotiations on climate change policy, it becomes relevant to consider the ethical dimensions of the issue. In formulating policies, empirical facts about the issue have to be synergized with ethical principles regarding how to make decisions given these facts and how to assess the impacts of such decisions.

2. The Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change

Why should climate change be an ethical concern as well, and not just a scientific or economic one? In response to this question, the *Declaration of the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change* was drafted in December of 2004, Buenos Aires, by the following institutions: the Pennsylvania Consortium for Interdisciplinary Environmental Policy, Rock Ethics Institute at Penn State University, IUCN Commission on Environmental Law-Ethics Working Group, Centre for Applied Ethics at Cardiff University, Centre for Global Ethics at Birmingham University, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, and EcoEquity. The declaration outlined the ethical questions raised by climate change and called for greater ethical reflection in the process of formulating sustainable, equitable and just climate change policies. The declaration reads as follows:

Whereas, although there is a large and growing scientific and economic literature on climate change, there is insufficient reflection on the ethical dimensions of many climate change issues;

Whereas, this insufficient reflection is surprising and alarming given that climate change policies raise profound ethical issues concerning, e.g., which humans, societies, communities, plants, animals, and ecosystems will survive and which persons and countries will bear the burden of climate change;

Whereas, reflection on the ethical dimensions of climate change policy-making is urgent because:

1. Unless the ethical dimensions are considered, the international community may choose responses that are ethically unsupportable or unjust;

2. Many profound ethical questions are hidden in scientific and economic arguments about various climate change policy proposals;

3. An equitable approach to climate change policy is necessary to overcome barriers currently blocking progress in international negotiations;

4. An ethically based global consensus on climate change may prevent further disparities between rich and poor, and reduce potential international tension that

will arise from climate-caused food and water scarcities and perceived inequitable use of the global atmospheric commons as a carbon sink.

Whereas, human activities in one part of the world that generate greenhouse gases are threatening humans, plants, animals, and ecosystems in other parts of the world, all people should acknowledge and act on their common but differentiated responsibilities to prevent harm from climate change and to bear their fair share of responsibility for damages and the steps that need to be taken to protect against foreseeable damages;

Whereas current approaches to climate change by some countries are ethically unsupportable;

Whereas, for some climate change issues existing principles of international law, if followed, should be sufficient to provide an adequate normative basis for policy formation, yet for other issues new ethically-based international norms will need to be discussed and adopted;

Whereas, without sufficient ethical guidance, national climate change policies can lead to economic development activities inconsistent with established norms of sustainable development;

Whereas, current approaches to climate change by some countries are often inconsistent with numerous international agreements that establish universal human rights and responsibilities;

Therefore, we conclude that:

1. Further and more detailed ethical reflection on the ethical issues entailed by specific climate change questions and positions is an international imperative.

2. This ethical reflection must seek to include the views and participation of people, organizations, and governments around the world, especially those from developing countries and those who are most vulnerable to climate change.

3. Some of the most important ethical issues entailed by climate change include:

a. Who is ethically responsible for the consequences of climate change, that is, who is liable for the burdens of:

i. preparing for and then responding to climate change (i.e. adaptation)

ii. unavoids damages?

b. What ethical principles should guide the choice of specific climate change policy objectives including but not limited to maximum human-induced warming, and atmospheric greenhouse gas targets?

c. What ethical principles should be followed in allocating responsibility among people, organizations, and governments at all levels to prevent ethically intolerable impacts from climate change?

d. What principles of procedural justice should be followed to assure fair representation at all levels in decision-making about climate change?

e. Are commonly used reasons for delaying climate change action ethically justified? These reasons include:

i. Costs to national economies.

ii. *The absence of developing nations' emissions reduction targets*

iii. *The future invention of less-costly technologies.*

The declaration asks what ethical principles should guide the determination of climate change policy objectives, given that although all countries have the common objective of reducing damages to climate change, we operate within different contexts and therefore should have differentiated but complementary responsibilities. In the process of formulating policy, we need to reflect on what sort of world would we like to pass down to the next generation and what would be required of us to achieve this world – i.e. what mix of mitigation and adaptation would be sustainable. What national targets for reducing greenhouse gases are equitable? And if what is equitable is not enough to ease the momentum of GHGs already present in the atmosphere, then how much degradation from human-induced climate change should be tolerated and adapted to by the international community?

Furthermore, we could ask, who are suffering these adverse effects and who should be held liable? Certainly, developing countries reliant on season-based livelihoods such as agriculture and fishing would be more vulnerable to the impacts, while highly-industrialized countries would be more responsible for the causes. But while it is true that the developed countries are responsible for more voluminous emissions of greenhouse gases as compared to developing countries, it is difficult to lay blame because during the age of industrialization, there simply was no knowledge of climate change, no way to predict the consequences of the growing dependency on fossil fuels. However, now that we are aware of these consequences, we have a moral responsibility to include them in decision-making. This applies not only to developed countries, but also to developing countries that cannot ethically pursue the same development pathway blindly. Alternate means to industrialization must be sought. In this regard, do the developed nations have special responsibilities to assist the poorer nations? Given our varied contexts and respective capacities, what are our “common but differentiated responsibilities?”

These ethical issues are only the tip of the iceberg, however, as the international community continues to debate on the optimal response to climate change. The difficulty lies not only in the scientific uncertainty. Even if this uncertainty did not exist and everyone was in agreement on the future of climate change, there may still be disputes on what kind of ethical principle to apply in decision-making. The use of different principles to evaluate the same set of facts would lead to different ethical principles, hence the need for greater ethical reflection and discussion (Hurka 1993). In light of this need, this paper, then, attempts to discuss how one particular normative principle – consequentialism –

can be used as a guide towards policy formulation, what forms of this are the most appropriate for the task at hand, and how this approach may be supplemented by other normative theories or philosophies.

3. Consequentialism and its Forms

Consequentialism is a normative principle in which the moral rightness or wrongness of a choice or act is measured solely by its overall consequences, disregarding the circumstances surrounding or occurring before the act, and the intrinsic nature of the act. Historically, consequentialism descends from utilitarianism, among the primary proponents of which are Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mills, Henry Sidgwick and Amartya Sen. Classic utilitarianism continues today as one of the paradigmatic forms of consequentialism.

Classic utilitarianism states that an act is morally right if it maximizes the good, meaning, if the difference between the total amount of good and the total amount of bad for all is greatest. However, there are various contentions for what qualifies as “good.” *Hedonistic utilitarianism* of Bentham and Mill’s era claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good while pain is the only intrinsic bad. The goal, therefore, is to promote the greatest happiness for the most people (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006). This principle was subjected to criticism, however, as contemporaries of Bentham and Mill argued that hedonism reduced the value of human life to the level of animals. Mill counters this by distinguishing among higher and lower qualities of pleasure.

The definition of “pleasure” and “pain” also came under scrutiny. To define pleasure merely as sensations excluded the “propositional pleasure” in which a state of affairs that a person finds pleasing exists. For example, having ample water to irrigate crops during a drought or durable shelter to weather typhoons are preferred states of affairs. Thus, what is good can also refer to the satisfaction of certain desires or the fulfillment of certain preferred states, while the bad is the absence or frustration of such preferences. Utilitarians who adopt this definition are called *preference utilitarians*. The major criticism against this form is that human beings, flawed as they are, may have preferences that are misinformed. A factory owner, for example, who prefers to maximize profits by not spending for GHG abatement may change his mind if he knew of the far-reaching impacts of climate change.

Closely related to preference utilitarianism is the welfarist theory. If the “good” to be aimed for is individual welfare or satisfaction, then utilitarianism becomes a *welfarist consequentialism*. Here, assessing consequences requires sum-ranking individual utilities (Sen 1982).

Other utilitarians such as George Edward Moore argue that values cannot be expressed merely as pleasure/pain or desire satisfaction/frustration. Thus, a more pluralistic definition of “good” should be adopted, which takes into account beauty, truth and knowledge, friendship, love,

freedom, etc. as well. This principle is called *ideal utilitarianism*.

As the different forms of utilitarianism show us, consequentialism says nothing about what kinds of outcomes are good or bad – hence, people can disagree on what is preferable and what should be avoided. There are no “absolutely right” actions that must be pursued regardless of consequences or “absolutely wrong” actions that must be avoided regardless of consequences (Oderberg 2000). What consequentialism does assume is that it is possible to evaluate the results of each choice and that it is possible to compare each set of results.

There are several forms of consequentialism. Two major types are *act consequentialism* and *rule consequentialism*. The former claims that an act is right if it is the only option that maximizes a desired outcome, and that an act is permissible if it is one of two or more options that achieve maximization. This form is close to utilitarianism which aims to maximize the good. Act consequentialism is a type of *maximizing consequentialism* as opposed to the *satisficing* form. The former stresses that an act should bring about the best consequences while the former claims that an improvement of circumstances is enough.

On the other hand, rule consequentialism holds that an act is right if it conforms to a rule, which, if followed maximizes the desired outcome. If there are conflicting rules but each leads to maximization, then an act is permissible if it conforms to any one of these rules (Oderberg 2000). A rule consequentialist would ask, “What would happen if we accepted this rule? Would the desired outcome be maximized if everyone followed this rule that forbids a certain act?” or “What would happen if we were all permitted to do this? Would better or worse circumstances develop?” Thus, the consequences of a rule – a rule reducing GHG emission for example – rather than the rule itself are judged as good or bad.

Other variations of consequentialism are *actual consequentialism*, which judges the morality of a choice by the actual consequences, not by anything intended or probable. In contrast, *expectable consequentialism* considers evaluates outcomes that can be reasonably foreseen or expected. In this case, the risk associated with the occurrence of negative consequences (or likewise, the probability of positive consequences) is enough reason to include these consequences in cost-benefit analysis.

Consequentialism can also be divided according to partiality. *Agent-centered consequentialism* introduces a bias into the decision-making process since the valuing of the outcomes is based solely on the agent’s preferences while excluding the impact on others. *Agent-neutral consequentialism*, on the other hand, claims that whether a consequence is valued as good or bad does not depend on the perspective of the agent. Instead, decisions are made through the eyes of an impartial observer who considers the impacts on all

people. It has been argued that only agent-neutral forms are true forms of consequentialism.

Examples of agent-neutral forms are *equal consideration consequentialism* and *universal consequentialism* (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006). Equal consideration claims that in determining moral rightness, the impacts on one person matter just as much as those on another person. Universal consequentialism takes this a step further, and judges moral rightness by the impacts for all humans and sentient beings, including animals. This has its roots, perhaps, from classic utilitarianism which holds that animals, having the ability to feel pleasure and pain, should also be considered in the utilitarian calculation of the best overall consequences. However, this still does not allow for a truly ecocentric ethics of the environment because flora, rivers and ecosystems would be excluded from the moral concern of the utilitarian (Kaufman 2006).

Lastly, concerns about distribution may be integrated into consequentialism. An *egalitarian consequentialist* would prefer that a smaller quantity of benefits be distributed equally over a greater number of people rather than some people have a disproportionate share of the maximum amount of benefits (Hurka 1993). In this case, distribution takes priority over the total amount of good.

Indeed, the theory of consequentialism is a complex one, and the aforementioned forms of consequentialism are by no means exhaustive. Different variations and combinations of variations exist, based on what outcomes are to be evaluated and how this evaluation is to be executed. The overview presented here is merely the tip of the iceberg, introducing the forms most relevant to the task at hand – the application of consequentialism to the formulation of climate change policy.

4. Applying Consequentialism to Climate Change Policy

To apply consequentialism as a normative guide in the balancing of mitigation and adaptation policies, there are three major issues that must be resolved: (1) We must agree on what kinds of outcomes are good or bad. (2) We must define our scope – i.e. who or what matters in the evaluation of impacts. (3) Lastly, we must explore the different ethical conclusions that might be drawn by considering maximization, satisfaction and distribution concerns. In the process of discussion, certain forms of consequentialism reveal themselves as being more compatible with policy-formulation as guiding normative principles than others, and as leaning more towards mitigation than adaptation or vice versa.

Forecasting Outcomes: an Argument against Actual Consequentialism

Firstly, we must be clear as to what sort of outcomes are good or bad. The desired state would be that which avoids the foreseeable damages due to the effects of

climate change such as the altered temperature and precipitation patterns leading to decreased agricultural productivity, the frequent severe weather events, and the sea-level rise drowning coastal communities and even wiping small island states off the map. Granted, there are potentially positive consequences for the agricultural sectors of temperate regions that would experience lengthened growing cycles. However, these are consequences that have to be weighed against the extent of negative consequences, and compared to a “baseline” scenario in which the act or policy is not implemented.

The fact that the evaluation of outcomes requires that we construct scenarios – the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, policy A scenario, policy B scenario and so on – implies that we are dealing primarily with predicted or foreseeable consequences. Without further studies to separate natural climate variability from climate change trends, there is very little we can point to now as actual effects of climate change. Thus, we can see that applying actual consequentialism would rule out the need for precautionary mitigation and adaptation policies since the impacts of climate change are shrouded in uncertainty and will progress gradually through the next hundred years. The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), a document signed by the international community, states that the precautionary principle must be applied in this situation. Scientific uncertainty is not an excuse to delay response to climate change. Response must therefore be crafted according to the reasonably foreseen consequences, meaning that it is expectable consequentialism rather than actual consequentialism that ought to be applied.

One may ask, but aren't all decisions based on foreseen consequences precisely because we want to prevent the negative consequences from becoming actualities at all? Isn't actual consequentialism only truly possible in hindsight, when after all has been said and done, we can evaluate our past choices based on what real transpired after? Any evaluation of choices before they have actually been implemented can, at best, be premised only on probabilities.

While this is true, we may also argue that certain consequences may already be known from experience – for example, dumping a certain amount phosphates in a body of water causes eutrophication, excessive emissions of sulfates and nitrates fall as acid rain, and denudation of forests hastens soil erosion. In short, there are causative mechanisms in the environment that are reasonable well-understood and documented, in which case, actual consequentialism could be applicable. However, the current global warming phenomenon is unprecedented, so there is no way of knowing what the actual consequences will be. Even assigning probabilities to the different possible scenarios is difficult since they depend on complex and interrelated factors, including the socio-economic parameters. To

wait for the benefit of hindsight may result in a state in which it would be too late for any effective remedy. The rule of thumb, therefore, in climate change decision-making is to consider the worst case scenario and include everything that might possible go wrong.

Consequences for Whom: an Argument against Agent-Centered Consequentialism

Secondly, we must ask, consequences for whom? Who and what matter in the scope of our decision-making? Spatially, do we consider people within our own community or everywhere else around the globe? Temporally, do we include people alive now or future generations as well, in accordance with the principle of intergenerational responsibility? Lastly, are we concerned with people only? With sentient beings like people and animals? Or with all life forms and ecosystems in general? In short, which beings have ethical standing (Hurka 1993)?

If only the current generations were within our purview, then climate change policies would be slanted towards allowing climate change to occur and leaving future generations to adapt rather than implementing any mitigation now. This is because the impacts of climate change are still not fully felt today and any mitigation would involve immediate expenditures without any tangible benefits. However, such a perspective violates the principle of intergenerational equity. It also renders moot the entire exercise of formulating policies to address climate change, given that the predicted impacts will mostly be realized decades into the future. It makes no sense, then, to limit our scope only to consequences to the present generation.

If only a specific country or community was of concern, then it would be impossible to craft any international climate change policy that would be amenable to everyone! Policies would vary according to our contexts. For example, developing countries which have minimal GHG emissions would be concerned mostly with adaptation. Developed countries that still engage in vulnerable livelihoods like agriculture, forestry and fisheries may opt for a mix of mitigation and adaptation strategies depending on the predicted impact on such livelihoods. Countries that have minimal dependence on these livelihoods and are therefore less likely to suffer from climate change may have little incentive for either mitigation or adaptation. Thus, instead of having “common but differentiated responsibilities” the situation in the international community would be one of *kanya-kanyahan* – each country to its own without regard to how its actions affect others.

This would be unfortunate given also that the problem involves the atmosphere as a “global commons.” The “NIMBY” (Not-in-my-backyard) mentality is no longer tenable since science has shown how the atmosphere circulates, bringing greenhouse gases and other forms of air pollution across boundaries. It would be quite

difficult then to defend a consequentialist approach that does not consider the global system.

The last question on whether to include non-human beings, however, is not as straightforward to answer as the spatial and temporal questions. While the universal form of consequentialism includes animals into our scope, flora and other elements of an ecosystem are still excluded. Such a perspective would bias policies towards adaptation rather than mitigation – that sentient beings are able to cope with the new circumstances is all that matters. Mitigation would only be considered insofar as the changes are predicted to occur to an extent beyond the capacity of human and animal communities to cope. Even then, there would be no need to reduce GHG emissions as much as possible, only as much as needed for adaptation to be feasible.

If the impacts on entire ecosystems are to be included in the decision-making process in an “expanded universal” consequentialist principle, then there would be more justification for mitigation. Climate change would alter the integrity and the character of our ecosystems beyond their carrying capacities. If we are to preserve our ecosystems, then avoidance of climate change should be given priority over adaptation to climate change. However, this ecocentric view is a controversial one, in that it gives equal weight to the good of non-humans entities compared to human communities, despite the fact that humans experience more levels of happiness and suffering. As Thomas Hurka asks, “how much human sacrifice is ethically required to preserve, for example, an Arctic ecosystem?” (Hurka 1993) Unfortunately, consequentialism only prescribes how decision-making should proceed once the scope and outcomes are defined, but does not in itself provide any justification for the scope.

In summary, a people-here-and-now-only scope that is characteristic of agent-centered consequentialism (assuming we are the agents) would be irreconcilable with climate change policies. If we were to consider only our own welfare or happiness, then why go through the trouble and the expenses of mitigation or adaptation? Why not promote economic growth with maximum profits without worrying about how GHG emissions are affecting other countries? Why worry about generations yet to be born, much less fauna, flora and other elements of ecosystems? Agent-centered consequentialism opens the door for the fulfillment of our own preferences without considering the inevitable impact on other peoples or beings. The bias would be towards letting climate change occur in favor of economic benefits. This defeats the purpose and the spirit of climate change policy which is to promote an equitable approach to the problem and to encourage parties to commit to a lifestyle change. This will involve sacrifices both from developed countries that need to cap their emissions, and developing countries that need to industrialize without becoming fossil fuel-dependent. From a moral

standpoint, we could say that the time during which the people will exist is irrelevant; as long as there is a possibility of people being benefited or harmed, then they must be considered (Barcalow 2003) Thus, an agent-centered approach is also not appropriate as a guiding principle.

Maximizing, Satisficing or Egalitarian: the Nature of Our Legacy

Whether we use the maximizing, satisficing or egalitarian forms would also result in different ethical conclusions about the “right” mix of mitigation and adaptation policies. The last issue to resolve, therefore, is, in what state do we intend to leave the Earth for the next generation? To what extent do we prevent climate change and to what extent do we allow it to occur and then adapt (Hurka 1993)?

The maximizing approach can have three interpretations. The first is one that aims to prevent all adverse impacts and therefore leave the Earth in the same conditions and with the same resources as it had before global warming. In this case, policies would favor extensive and comprehensive mitigation. This option may not be feasible, however, due to the long lifetime of GHGs in the atmosphere and the momentum of the climate system which in the face of which we are currently powerless to halt. However, if we take maximization to mean avoiding as many adverse impacts as possible given today’s technology instead of having to avoid all, this would be more tenable scientifically in the sense that the technology for GHG reduction is available. What is uncertain is whether the manufacture and use of such technology can be supported economically – that is, if economies can shoulder the extra costs that would be incurred by GHG mitigation. Lastly, if we take maximization to mean generating the best outcomes all things concerned – technology, economy and other resources – then there would be more flexibility for mixing mitigation and adaptation policies. This last interpretation, which essentially means doing the best we can, all things considered, is perhaps closest in essence to the Kyoto Protocol’s recognition of common but differentiated capacities and the ASEM’s recognition of respective capacities.

If, in accordance with the satisficing principles, the goal is merely to preserve the Earth in a state that is at least better (but not the best) than what would have been if climate change had run its course, then policies would favor a mix of mitigation and adaptation. There would be enough mitigation just to ensure that the adverse impacts of climate change are reduced, without necessarily having to commit to extensive economic sacrifices since adaptation strategies can be implemented to reduce vulnerability to whatever climate change that does occur. This option is more tenable, although the exact mix has to be discussed among countries in much the same way as the Kyoto Protocol

commitments were negotiated. There has to be clear criteria and indicators by which we can say that our goal has been satisfied.

Finally, we have the egalitarian form, which emphasizes the equal distribution of benefits. This form is not mutually exclusive with either the maximizing or satisficing forms, but it does support the argument for mitigation rather than adaptation. Because the atmosphere acts as a global sink for GHGs, any mitigation effort will benefit everyone around the globe in more or less equal amounts. Adaptation, on the other hand, is community specific. It involves predicting the impacts to be suffered by a certain locale and implementing strategies to decrease vulnerability to these impacts. Both the costs and benefits, therefore, only accrue in that community. The only way to apply egalitarian consequentialism in this case is to make sure that all the sectors of the community share in the adaptation costs and benefits.

A Consequentialist Form for Climate Change Policies

Thus far, we have concluded that an appropriate form of consequentialism in the crafting climate change policies would definitely be an expectable and agent-neutral one. Whether or not the scope of decision-making includes ecosystems rather than humans only requires further justification. While environmental managers ought to aim for a holistic and ecocentric approach to problem-solving, the best philosophical and ethical groundings for doing so are outside the realm of consequentialism, as will be discussed in the next section. The choice between a maximizing form and a satisficing form depends largely on the state of the economy. A maximizing egalitarian approach would be ideal, but should further research show that this is not feasible, then satisficing consequentialism shall be used, provided that the minimum criteria for satisfaction is made clear.

5. Supplementing Consequentialism

As the previous discussion has revealed, consequentialism is by no means a complete guide for the ethical principles of climate change. For one, it has not considered issues pertaining to rights, equity, justice and compensation. Another deficiency is that it has not provided any philosophical foundation or underpinning for the inclusion (or exclusion) of non-sentient beings. Consequentialism, then, cannot be used as a complete standalone principle if all the ethical dimensions of climate change are to be addressed. Thus, we turn to other theories and philosophies to supplement it.

Rights: A Need for Deontological Theories

One deficiency in the application of consequentialism to climate change issues is its lack of concern for rights, justice and compensation, which are explicitly tackled in the Declaration of the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Although consequences are a major

consideration in decision-making, they are not the only ones. To illustrate, let us consider Paolo Coelho's latest novel, *The Devil and Miss Prym*. In the story, a stranger comes to a small village by the mountains which has been left behind by the times. The stranger makes a proposition to Miss Prym, the hotel bartender who has longed to leave town and build a life elsewhere. He says that if the villagers manage to commit one just murder, then he would give them enough gold to save the village from ruin and secure everyone's future. The villagers then select an old woman who spends her days sitting on her porch, doing nothing "productive" to contribute to the community. Consequentialism would aver that the benefits outweigh the costs in this case. After all, what is one life offered for the sake of an entire community? However, as the popular saying goes, "the end does not justify the means." The act which brings about the best overall consequences is not necessarily one which most people would consider as morally permissible because it would infringe on a person's right to life.

To say that a being possesses rights is more than just saying a being has ethical standing. The latter would simply mean that their interests are taken into consideration and are weighed against those of other beings in the calculating costs and benefits. This does preclude the possibility that the chosen act or policy is one that brings about the most benefits by harming certain being's interests. However, if it is acknowledged that the being has rights, then it has interests that are wrong to damage even if it results in more good than bad consequences overall.

Rights, then, represent constraints to the means by which we bring about a preferred state of affairs because they prohibit certain acts regardless of the consequences. An act consequentialist, for example, would be concerned only about how to maximize a particular benefit with his choices, but respect for rights can conflict with this requirement (Oderberg 2000). For example, if, for the sake of maintaining or increasing economic profits, developed countries opted to mitigate GHGs minimally and to instead rely on adaptive strategies in areas most vulnerable to climate change, then one could contest that such a policy would infringe on the right to life and preservation on integrity in ecosystems that are not able to adapt.

Rule consequentialism as well does not explicitly recognize rights even if it does recognize rules because it is concerned primarily with the optimality of rules. A rule to protect a given right would be respected only insofar as it maximizes a given benefit, thus introducing an element of conditionality to these rights.

Consequentialism, then, can be supplemented by deontological theories which hold that the rightness or wrongness is in the nature of the act rather than results. It is inherently based rights and universal laws, particularly human rights. Humans, having a conscience or the capacity for morality, also have free will and dignity. To infringe upon the free will and dignity of any

human being is wrong, regardless of consequences. Deontological theories also favor equality and justice – in which justice is defined as the virtue by which a person is inclined to accord another his rights (Oderberg 2000) – because these are consistent with dignity and respect for other human beings (Dwyer 2005).

One of the most well-known forms of deontology is the Kantian categorical imperative. Kant's *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* states that one should “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” To Kant, rationality is what makes people inherently and supremely valuable, to be treated as ends in themselves and never as instruments as we would a thing. There are at least three major features “personhood”: (1) People are conscious of the environment. (2) People are aware of themselves as beings that persist through time. (3) People have the ability to communicate, reason, and solve problems (Barcalow 2003). Thus, all people's everywhere are equal not just in ethical standing but also in rights simply because of the capacity to be rational. In terms of promoting a universal law, Kant alternatively formulates the categorical imperative in *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* as “act only accordingly to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” This reflects even more the equality of peoples and the consideration for justice.

Bringing this to be bear on the climate change issue, we cannot force others to ratify emission reduction commitments if we ourselves are not willing to make those commitments ourselves. Agricultural sectors in cooler regions cannot let the warmer regions simply bear the burden of adaptation while they reap the benefits of a longer growing season, since this is an unjust and inequitable sharing of costs and benefits. Developed countries cannot expect developing countries not to industrialize, despite the positive effects of restricting GHG emissions, because it is what developed countries have done and would like to continue to do. What they can do is to help poorer regions find or evolve the necessary technologies for progressing without the associated GHG emissions. Such a strategy may even bring about the best consequences in the long-run since it is often more cost-effective to invest in new, cleaner and more efficient industrial facilities in developing countries rather than to retrofit all the existing plants in the developed world. The same applies to adaptation policies. Adaptation must be carried out where the damages are the greatest, which is in developing countries, but the developed countries who largely responsible for climate change in the first place and who are best able to pay, should assist the poorer nations. Not only does this have the potential to bring about the best consequences but it also an equitable approach to cost-sharing (Hurka 1993).

Our duty, then, is not only to promote the good consequences but also to ensure that rights are upheld.

The ethically correct act is therefore the one with the best consequences which does not violate any rights (Hurka 1993). A *utilitarianism of rights* approach could be integrated into consequentialism with rights weighed against the outcomes desired or to be avoided. In addition, the concern for equity requires that compensation be given to those whose rights have been harmed or to those that have been become unwilling victims of a phenomenon triggered by others. This imposes an additional consideration in policy-formulation since compensations for harm done must be included as one of the consequences being weighed.

Ecocentrism: Thomism as a Justification

As previously pointed out, consequentialism provides few guidelines for deciding which beings have ethical standing and delineating the scope of impacts that matter. The only consideration is whether a being is able to feel pleasure or pain, or differentiate between good or bad, thus limiting the scope to sentient beings. The Kantian categorical imperative is even stricter in its scope of beings with inherent value since rationality rather than mere sentience is the criterion.

Climate change, however, is a phenomenon that is all-encompassing, affecting entire ecosystems. If consequentialism is to match the scale on which climate change operates, then it must be of an “expanded universal” form which includes not only humans and animals but also plants and other forms of being that compose ecosystems. To justify such an ecocentric scope that places intrinsic value in the functional integrity of ecosystems (Kaufman 2003), we turn to Thomist philosophy.

St. Thomas Aquinas recognizes the inherent worth of all beings as participating in the dynamism of existence that stems from and is sustained by the Source of Being. This provides for a more personal approach to nature. Nature ceases to be merely an instrument for humanity but becomes a gift to be thankful for and to care for. The act of being is relational one in that not only do we share in the Source but we are interdependent with other beings for sustenance and growth. However, although existence can share itself infinitely, it is limited by the nature of the particular being, and it is this limit that imposes an ethical demand on what we can do to or expect from each community of beings. Every being, insofar as it exists, has the right to sustain itself, to remain in being as far as possible. The goal of its very presence is the self-expression or active self-communication of being itself to promote its own “flowering” in the universe (Clarke 1996). This goal cannot be met if we are simply to let climate change throw entire ecosystems out of balance, and we cannot ethically expect nature to just be able to adjust to anthropogenically-induced changes at rates that far outpace nature's capacity to cope. Thus, Thomist philosophy provides the underpinning for expanding the scope of consequentialism beyond sentient beings.

This philosophy supports the idea of the common good as well. The common good is usually regarded as a utilitarian ideal, in that it espouses the greatest good for the greatest number of people, which, according to the Kyoto Protocol and ASEM, can be achieved through a variety of complementary efforts and cooperation among nations. Aquinas' theory of Being provides the philosophical foundation for the common good. All beings are ordered to find the truth and do the good, but all deliberations and decisions to do so take place within the larger context of the society or ecosystem we live in. Because we are all sharing in the act of existence, all beings, functioning within the limits of our respective natures, have to work harmoniously with the others to achieve the common good. To violate the common good would ultimately mean to violate our own interests. Given the interconnectedness of nature, any act done in selfishness will eventually have negative repercussions. In the context of climate change, industrialized countries, for example, cannot continue releasing GHGs into the atmospheric commons in the name of economic profits without any adverse consequence, be it a damaged image in the international community in the short run or actual losses due to uncontrolled climate change in the long run.

Climate change laws and policies, then, according to Aquinas, should be concerned with promoting communal benefits. Aquinas says that "we term 'just' those legal acts which produce and preserve happiness and its components within the...community (Halsall 1996)." What Aquinas is calling for is essentially to develop a virtue of solidarity through such laws and policies. Solidarity, as adapted from the definition of Max Scheler, is neither collectivity nor individuality, but recognition of the "complementarity" of all beings, ecosystems, sectors and nations, with each having its particular niche that contributes to the global community.

Now that we can justify the expanded universal scope of climate change decision-making, we must answer the major contention against such a scope: Do the impacts on other beings matter as much as the impacts on humans? How much should humanity sacrifice to preserve current ecosystems that are not able to adapt as quickly as needed, regardless of whether these ecosystems are populated or have an economic value? Is the expanded universal consequentialism an "equal consideration" form as well?

Extending rights to non-human species is controversial. To do so would mean having to acknowledge that it is wrong to interfere with an ecosystem. In this case, mitigation would be the only solution. However, science has shown that this is untenable. Even if all the countries that ratified the Kyoto protocol were to meet their emission reduction commitments, GHGs from past emissions would still persist in the atmosphere for some time and the momentum of climate change would not be halted,

although the impacts may be less severe. Whether we can prevent any more change from happening through greater commitments is up for debate, as our economic resources may not be able to support a strict and comprehensive mitigation policy, especially in developing countries.

Again, St. Thomas Aquinas can help shed some light on this issue. Aquinas himself recognized that there are different intensities of existence. These levels, in increasing order, start with the minerals, then plants, then animals, followed by human beings and then the angels. One could propose that, in the process of weighing rights and consequences involved in different policy alternatives, all beings would be important, although the harm against those of a higher degree would weigh more than those against a lower degree simply because, given the momentum of climate change, something will inevitably have to bear some damage. We have gone past the point of reversibility, and so have to weigh carefully how the unavoidable burdens are to be distributed. The recognition of all beings as important but at the same belonging to a hierarchy of intensities would favor mitigation as being beneficial for all beings, but would be realistic in acknowledging that some amount of change would have to be tolerated and it is the human community's responsibility to adapt in such a way that lessens environmental stresses so that other beings would not have to bear any more damage in addition to what it unavoidable.

6. Summary and Conclusions

Climate change is indeed a complex phenomenon which impacts every aspect of our everyday life. To reflect on its ethical dimensions in the process of policy formulation already necessarily implies considering the scientific, socio-economic, political and cultural aspects as well. Thus, in the words of Thomas Hurka (1993), "an ethical judgment about a climate change policy is not just one judgment among many, to be weighed against economic, political and other judgments in deciding how, all things considered, to act. It is in itself an all-things-considered judgment..."

Given this encompassing role that ethics must fulfill, there is a need to determine what normative theories and philosophies can serve as guides to decision-making. Consequentialism is one such theory. However, the different forms of consequentialism lead to different conclusions regarding the rightness of wrongness of mitigation or adaptation policies. The most appropriate version of consequentialism is the agent-neutral, expectable, and expanded universal form, which is also, ideally, one that is also maximizing and egalitarian. To apply it to policy formulation, we must be clear about the outcomes that are to be avoided versus the outcomes that are desired. We must also be clear about the scope, meaning, whose interests matter and if other beings aside from people have ethical standing. However, there are deficiencies in consequentialism. It does not address

the issue of rights and justice, and it does not provide any philosophical justification for including ecosystems in its scope rather than does human beings. For the former, we need a deontological approach, such as the Kantian categorical imperative, and for the latter, we turn to the Thomist philosophy of Being.

One thing that is clear from this discussion is that there is no one principle, theory or philosophy that can completely address all the issues raised by climate change. Thus, we must continue in the process of ethical reflection, exploring the ways by which different philosophies can be integrated and synergized in order to refine the way we make decisions.

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Bangkok Declaration on Ethics in Science and Technology

4th Session of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST)

Following a regional ministerial meeting held during the Fourth Session of COMEST, the Bangkok Declaration on Ethics in Science and Technology was signed on 25 March 2005. The Bangkok Declaration recognizes the importance of an ethical approach to scientific and technological advances and expresses the commitment of the Governments represented to cooperate in this regard. States Parties to the Bangkok Declaration include: Bhutan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.

WE, Ministers for Science and Technology, considering the important role of ethical framework in science and technology by initiating and supporting the process of democratic norm building which awareness raising, capacity building and standard setting are therefore the key thrusts of UNESCO's strategy in this and all other areas;

NOTING with deep satisfaction that our countries have forged a close and beneficial relationship since this approach is founded upon UNESCO's ideal of "true dialogue, based upon respect for commonly shared values and the dignity of each civilization and culture";

ENCOURAGED by the significant progress for years of the programmes in the area of Ethics in Science and Technology, as supported by UNESCO;

RECOGNISING that Science ethics is necessary to articulate the basic values of science and scientific research when there is a growing risk of conflicts of interest (e.g., due to publication pressure, commercialization, security needs) as well as traditional and non-traditional issues affecting human ethics, require a more coherent and well-coordinated response at the regional level;

ACKNOWLEDGING the shared goals and partnerships formed with relevant institutions between countries to promote ethics of science and technology focusing on formulating policies and legislations on ethical and good governance in science and technology, building human capacity, sharing science and technology with fairer trade rules and negotiations, creating networks to enhance science and technology development, promoting the role of youth in science and technology, science, technology, and environment protection, and increasing developing countries' access to new areas of science and technology (such as nanotechnology and space);

DESIRING to conclude an agreement with a view to ensuring the establishment and operation of appropriate policies and legislation on ethics of science and technology and mechanisms to support human resource development activities;

HEREBY DECLARE TO:

1. ENHANCE science and technology cooperation which emphasizes fair trade more than free trade.

2. DEVELOP cooperation in Intellectual Property (IP) which aims at Benefits to Humanity over Commercial Benefit, especially in the Least Developed Countries that have less ability to access IP.

3. PROMOTE the role of youth in science and technology to encourage youth scientist development.

4. URGE Mutual Understanding of the importance of ethical and steadfast development of emerging technology (such as nanotechnology, radiation, satellite, biotechnology, human organ replacement, for example) based on public understanding and due care for the impacts of technology.

Done in Bangkok, Thailand, this 25th day of March Two Thousand and Five, on the occasion of the 4th Session of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST).

Dakar Declaration

Fifth Ordinary Session of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) on the Ethics of Science in Africa

Adopted on 9 December 2006, Dakar, Republic of Senegal

PREAMBLE,

WE, Ministers of Scientific Research and Technology of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), meeting at the Fifth Ordinary Session of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) from 6 to 9 December 2006 in Dakar, Senegal;

Guided by the Constitution of UNESCO which mandates the organization to promote “the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind” and to play a leading role in the area of ethics of science and technology;

Guided by the vision of African Heads of State who have adopted science and technology as fundamental paths for sustainable development;

Aware that, to translate this vision into reality, we need to bridge the scientific and technological divide between the developed countries and Africa;

Considering that Africa lags behind in the fundamental area of science and technology, as well as the risk this entails of its marginalization in decision-making at the global level;

Considering the complexity of issues related to science and technology and their applications, which requires a multidisciplinary and pluralistic approach;

Noting the acceleration of the process of globalization and considering that African societies are increasingly influenced by scientific progress and technological innovations;

Realising that African countries accord little attention to the ethical implications of science and technology and that ethical frameworks for scientific and technological research practices remain inadequate on the continent;

Considering the importance that UNESCO and the scientific community attribute to international instruments, in particular the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights adopted in 1997 and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted in 2005;

Taking note of the Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge resulting from the World Conference on Science, co-organised by UNESCO and the International Council of Scientific Unions at the University of Budapest in June 1999, which requested that particular attention be given to codes and regulations of scientific professions;

Considering the importance of training and awareness building on issues of science and technology;

Considering the recommendations of COMEST related to ethics of environment, the development and use of new technologies and the teaching of ethics;

Taking note of the results of discussions during the Fifth Session of COMEST on the social responsibility of young African researchers, ethics of science, codes of conduct, teaching of ethics of science and technology, ethics of environment including the issue of toxic waste, relations between biosecurity, biodiversity and genetically modified organisms;

Aware of the need for effective, responsible and transparent interaction between scientists, policy makers and civil society to address numerous challenges, in particular the management of toxic waste, biosecurity problems and non-compliance with norms for clinical tests,

BY THIS DECLARATION,

WE UNDERTAKE:

1. to reinforce our commitment to scientific and technological research for our societies by increased support to institutions, research programmes, and researchers;
2. to encourage exchanges, cooperation and building of synergies among our countries in the field of scientific research and technology both in the public and private sectors;
3. to support and encourage young researchers by providing them opportunities for high level training and for professional integration into the scientific community;
4. to pursue vigorous efforts to assure women a place in the scientific community;
5. to promote South-South and joint North-South cooperation by facilitating the mobility of scientists, the pursuit of common programmes, the networking among centres of excellence, and the mobilization of necessary funds;

6. to progressively put into place programmes for training and teaching of ethics in all academic curricula and professional training programmes, and also for researchers and networks of governmental and non-governmental institutions;
7. to create, support, and provide encouragement to committees on ethics of science and bioethics in our countries;
8. to set up a regional body responsible for :
 - ensuring the application of national and international texts aimed at the protection of human beings, societies, and the environment
 - seeing to it that codes of conducts are elaborated and enforced
 - encouraging the responsible involvement of women and young people in scientific and technological research
 - analysing the risks and benefits of research in order to ensure more sharing of research results
 - considering the possibility of preparing normative texts following international consultative processes (eg model laws like the one on biosafety)
9. to encourage cooperation between Ministries concerned by questions of ethics of science and technology;
10. to encourage and support meetings and forums held at the regional and sub-regional levels to promote exchanges on questions of ethics;
11. to work for strengthened collaboration in the field of ethics, bioethics and life sciences between universities, professional associations, research institutes and African ethics committees, and with regional and international partner institutions;

In the light of these commitments,

We, Ministers of Scientific Research and Technology:

Recommend that our States and Governments recognize the growing importance of the social and ethical implications of scientific and technological research, and translate this into our economic and social development policies.

Call on the Government of the Republic of Senegal to submit this Declaration to:

- The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS;

- The Authorities concerned in the African Union for review during the Eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in January 2007 on the theme "Science, Technology and Research for Development in Africa";
- The Director General of UNESCO.

Thank UNESCO for organizing the Fifth Ordinary Session of COMEST in Africa,

Call on UNESCO to develop a Regional Programme in collaboration with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in order to support ECOWAS Ministers in implementing this Declaration.

WE express our deep gratitude to His Excellency Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal as well as the people of Senegal for their warm, convivial, and friendly welcome and for the excellent organisation of this first meeting of COMEST on African soil, in Dakar.

Asian Bioethics Association (ABA)

The website for ABA is <eubios.info/ABA.htm>

Election Results

The board positions for 2006-2008 are:

President: Jayapaul Azariah

Vice President for China: Yanguang Wang

Vice President for India: Abnik Gupta

Vice President for Japan: Atsushi Asai

Vice President for West Asia: Aamir Jafarey

Vice-President for South Asia (East of India, excluding other named regions): Soraj Hongladarom

Vice President for Asian Ethnic and Religious

Minorities: Alireza Bagheri (Iran)

Vice President for Korea: Un Jong Pak

Secretary: Darryl Macer (Thailand/New Zealand)

Immediate Past-President: Sang-yong Song (Korea)

Election for the Chinese Vice-President

The results of the election for the Chinese vice-presidential position were 19 for Yanguang Wang and 16 for Lei Ruipeng. Prof. Wang was elected, confirmed by the secretary, current and past president.

The Board also welcomes persons who wish to act as *country or regional representatives*, and volunteers are requested by the secretariat. There will be meetings of the Board and a general meeting in the ABC8 conference, 19-23 March in Bangkok, Thailand.

Membership fees are usually payable at the time of renewal to *EJAIB*, the official journal of ABA. **A three tier system exists for annual fees:**

a) Regular price (US\$50 Euro 50 Yen 5000).

This includes the *EJAIB* journal subscription and free associate membership of Eubios Ethics Institute.

b) Reduced contribution (the amount is up to the member, and is also suggested for students)

This includes the *EJAIB* journal subscription.

c) No fee, because the person is not in a position to pay the fee.

This does not include a hard copy of the *EJAIB* journal, but anyone can apply to Eubios Ethics Institute separately for a hard copy of the Journal, to be considered case by case.

Persons who want to confirm their membership of the ABA must send their completed membership form and fees to the secretary (copy the form in this issue), Darryl Macer, (by Email, fax or airmail).

PLEASE RENEW ABA membership fees if you wish to continue to receive *EJAIB*! Also if you wish to vote and be eligible to stand in the November 2006 Board elections.

News in Bioethics & Biotechnology

<http://eubios.info/NBB.htm>

Codes of Ethics

<http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=4008>

International Bioethics Education Project News

<<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Bioethicseducation/>>

IAB Genetics & Bioethics Network: On-line

The complete address list is updated on the Internet. Send all changes to Darryl Macer. A website will be established at the IAB website soon.

UNESCO Asia-Pacific School of Ethics

<http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=4913>

Send papers to *EJAIB* Editorial Office

Editorial address:

Prof. Darryl Macer

RUSHSAP, UNESCO Bangkok,

920 Sukhumvit Rd, Prakanong,

Bangkok 10110, THAILAND

Fax: Int+66-2-664-3772

Email: asianbioethics@yahoo.co.nz

d.macer@unescobkk.org

Conferences

A bioethics conference calendar website is:
<http://www.who.int/ethics/events/en/>

UNU-UNESCO Bioethics Roundtable, 15-16 February, 2007.

UNESCO Bioethics Forum, 26-27 February, 2007; Islamabad, Pakistan. Contact: d.macer@unescobkk.org

Eighth Asian Bioethics Conference (ABC8), and the Second UNESCO Bangkok Bioethics Roundtable (BBRT2), 19-23 March 2007, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. Contact: Dr. Soraj Hongladarom Email: hsoaraj@chula.ac.th

<http://www.stc.arts.chula.ac.th/ABC2007/index.html>

UNESCO Bioethics Consultations, 11-13 April, Suva, Fiji; and 16-17 April, Apia, Samoa. Contact: Dr. Susan Vize, Email: susan@unesco.org.ws

International Conference: On the Ethical Life (The Philosophy of Peter Singer), at The University of Sydney, 19-21 April, 2007. Papers on any area of Prof. Peter Singer's ethics, or on the question of the "ethical life", will be considered. Please send an abstract with a brief cv to upcphilosophy@yahoo.com.au by March 25, 2007. For further information about the conference (speakers will include Prof Singer), please write to the "Convener" at the email: r.younis@syd.cqu.edu.au.

The 9th Annual Workshop on Ethical Issues in International Health Research, 11-15 June, 2007, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA.

Course website: www.hsph.harvard.edu/bioethics.

Contact Emily Kaditz: ekaditz@hsph.harvard.edu.

The goals of EJAIB include:

1. EJAIB is the official journal of the Asian Bioethics Association (ABA) and the IUBS Bioethics Program.
2. To review and update news and trends in bioethics from around the world. Bioethics is broadly defined as life ethics, including both medical and environmental ethics, and environmental, ethical, legal and social issues arising from biotechnology.
3. To pay particular attention to issues raised by genetic and reproductive technology, and other news for the International Association of Bioethics Genetics Network. To publish letters on such topics, promoting international debate.
4. To publish research papers, and relevant news, and letters, on topics within Asian Bioethics, promoting research in bioethics in the Asian region, and contributing to the interchange of ideas within and between Asia and global international bioethics. Asia is defined for the general purposes of this journal as the geographical area, including

the Far East, China, South East Asia, Oceania, the Indian subcontinent, the Islamic world and Israel.

5. To promote scientific responsibility, in coordination with MURS Japan (Universal Movement for Scientific Responsibility); and the International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS) Bioethics Program.

EJAIB Editor: Darryl Macer

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Send papers to the editor in electronic form if possible. Please use numbered reference style, do not use automatic footnotes or endnotes. Papers are peer reviewed.

The journal is independent of UNESCO and the contents are not endorsed by either Eubios Ethics Institute or UNESCO, but are published in the spirit of academic freedom.

South-South dialogue is encouraged, and papers outside of Asia and the Pacific are welcome.

How to order books or journal or the CD!

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Eubios Ethics Institute Publications (Books sent by SAL post, Journal by Airmail - Price included)**Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics**

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by Darryl Macer, Oct. 1990, 421pp.

Cost: US\$20 UK£10 NZ\$30 A\$25 C\$22 ¥2500 Others or credit card **NZ\$30****Equitable Patent Protection in the Developing World**

by William Lesser, May 1991, 150pp.

Cost: US\$15 UK£8 NZ\$20 A\$20 C\$17 ¥1500

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by Darryl Macer, May 1992 330pp.

Cost: US\$30 UK£15 NZ\$35 A\$30 C\$30 ¥3000

NZ\$40**Human Genome Research & Society**

230pp. ISBN 0-908897-04-9 (Japanese), 240pp.

Eds: Norio Fujiki & Darryl R.J. Macer July 1992 ISBN 0-908897-03-0 (English),

NZ\$30**Intractable Neurological Disorders, Human Genome Research and Society** Eds: N. Fujiki & D. Macer

Feb. 1994 ISBN 0-908897-06-5 (English), 320pp. ISBN 0-908897-07-3 (Japanese), 340pp.

Cost: US\$25 UK£12 NZ\$30 A\$30 C\$27 ¥3000

NZ\$40**Bioethics for the People by the People**

by Darryl Macer,... May 1994 ISBN 0-908897-05-7, 460pp. Cost: US\$30 UK£15 NZ\$35 A\$35 C\$32 ¥3000

NZ\$50**Bioethics in High Schools in Australia, Japan and New Zealand,**

by D. Macer, Y. Asada, M. Tsuzuki, S. Akiyama, & N.Y. Macer

March 1996, ISBN 0-908897-08-1, 200pp.(A4)

Cost: US\$25 UK£15 NZ\$30 A\$30 C\$30 ¥2000

NZ\$40**Protection of the Human Genome and Scientific Responsibility (Bilingual)**

Editors: Michio Okamoto, Norio Fujiki & D.R.J. Macer,

April 1996, ISBN 0-908897-09-X, 210pp.

Cost: US\$25 UK£15 NZ\$30 A\$30 C\$30 ¥2500

NZ\$35**Bioethics in India** (includes 115 papers from Jan.1997 conference)

Eds: Jayapaul Azariah, Hilda Azariah & Darryl R.J. Macer

June 1998 ISBN 0-908897-10-3, 403 pp.

(Printed in India)

Cost: US\$30 UK£18 NZ\$34 A\$36 C\$36 ¥3000

NZ\$45**Bioethics is Love of Life: An alternative textbook**

by Darryl Macer, July 1998 ISBN 0-908897-13-8, 152pp. Cost: US\$26 UK£14 NZ\$34 A\$34 C\$32 ¥3000

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Eds: Norio Fujiki & Darryl R.J. Macer

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June 1998 ISBN 0-908897-12-X, 478 pp. October 1999 ISBN 0-908897-14-6 (Japanese), 320pp.

Ethical Challenges as we approach the end of the Human Genome Project

Editor: Darryl Macer, April 2000 ISBN 0-908897-15-4, 124pp. Cost: US\$20 UK£12 NZ\$30 A\$30 C\$30 ¥2500

NZ\$35**Bioethics Education in Japanese High Schools (in Japanese only)**

Editor: Darryl Macer April 2000 ISBN 0-908897-16-2, 112pp. Cost: US\$20 UK£12 NZ\$30 A\$30 C\$30 ¥1000

NZ\$35**Bioethics and the Impact of Human Genome Research in the 21st Century**

Eds: Norio Fujiki, Masakatsu Sudo, & Darryl R.J. Macer March 2001 (English and Japanese bilingual, 350pp).

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August 2003 ISBN 0-908897-19-7, 450pp. Cost: US\$35 Euro35 UK£20 NZ\$40 A\$38 C\$40 ¥3000

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November 2004 ISBN 0-908897-22-7 656 pp. Cost: US\$35 Euro35 UK£20 NZ\$40 A\$38 C\$40 ¥3000

NZ\$50**A Cross Cultural Introduction to Bioethics** 2006, 300pp. (A4)

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<<http://eubios.info/ABA.htm>>

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